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Abstract

Abraded and crumpled encryption allows communication software such as messaging platforms to ensure privacy for their users while still allowing for some investigation by law enforcement. Crumpled encryption ensures that each decryption is
costly and prevents law enforcement from performing mass decryption of messages.
Abrasion ensures that only large organizations like law enforcement are able to access
any messages. The current abrasion construction uses public key parameters such
as prime numbers which makes the abrasion scheme difficult to analyze and allows
possible backdoors. In this thesis, we introduce a new abrasion construction which
uses hash functions to avoid the problems with the current abrasion construction. In
addition, we present a proof-of-concept for using crumpled encryption on an email
server.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Recently there has been growing controversy over the usage of strong encryption in
messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and iMessage [9, 32]. Modern cryptography
allows anyone to protect their privacy using cheap computers and networks through
strong, end-to-end, encryption. But this same strong encryption can also prevent law
enforcement from performing important investigations [53, 32]. Many officials want
law enforcement to have the ability to bypass strong encryption for investigation [3],
sometimes called exceptional access. But some governments abuse this power and
have invaded their citizen’s privacy using digital methods [14].
Enforcing both privacy and public security is important, but it is not easy to do
both simultaneously. These two goals have lead to two extreme opinions on whether
to allow the use of end-to-end encryption in mass communication software. One
option, referred to as “Going Dark,” would mean allowing unbreakable encryption
everywhere. This would prevent the recovery of records even when permitted through
warrants [53, 30]. The converse, can be referred to as “Going Bright,” where we
allow governments mass access to recover communication through means such as
wiretapping [27].

1

1.1

Importance of compromise
To understand the importance of a compromise between privacy and safety, we

pose a theoretical, yet practical, scenario where a compromise between these two
positions is necessary.
Let’s say that the FBI is investigating a planned terrorist attack, but doesn’t yet
know the location. The terrorists are using a messaging platform to communicate
and coordinate. If we accept the “Going Dark” path, strong encryption is deployed
on the platform and there is nothing the FBI can do to find the location before it is
too late. This scenario would favor the “Going Bright” path, because this terrorist
attack could be prevented in this case.
Let’s now imagine that a group of whistleblowers are collecting evidence to expose
a corrupt official at the FBI. If we “go bright,” this corrupt official could learn about
these whistleblowers and use his or her power in the FBI to fire the whistleblowers.
In this case, we would want the “Going Dark” solution, where the whistleblowers’
communication was hidden from officials that would use that information to control
them.
Another unwanted scenario to consider is where a malicious attacker somehow
steals an FBI official’s access to the system used for the “Going Bright” solution
(access to wiretapping or backdoors). This could occur through some means such as
malware on their computer or social engineering. This malicious attacker would now
have unauthorized power to spy on Americans.
How can we plan a system that responds correctly in all of these situations, preventing surveillance of users with honest communication, while still allowing officials
to investigates threats to public safety?
Ideally, we want a solution that would allow law enforcement to recover exactly
2

what they need to complete their investigation and nothing else. Furthermore, we
want this solution to prevent any malicious adversary from reading any records in the
case of a breach.
Many would argue that these criminals could simply use different messaging apps
that did not have exceptional access built in [2]. We know that many criminals do
not do this, and would be caught if the major messaging platforms had exceptional
access [5, 4].
One construction intended to solve this problem is the Escrowed Encryption Standard, which was used by the Clipper chip [49]. There are currently many problems
with key escrow which encrypts messages with keys that law enforcement has access
to. Encrypting messages with these keys creates a single point of failure for mass,
malicious, decryption and provides many opportunities for programmers to code flaws
into their security protocols [22].
Would our justice system be able to function without access to digital records? If
the answer is no, then compromise is essential. More and more of our communication
is occurring online and increasing the need for a solution to this problem.

1.2

Abrasion and crumpling
In 2018, Wright and Varia proposed the concept of abraded and crumpled en-

cryption to protect records from unlimited investigation while still allowing for some
decryption [58, 59]. Diverging from previous schemes, crumpled and abraded encryption require no key escrow or backdoors, ensuring that there is no single point of
failure. Instead, these two encryptions require computational work to be done in order to recover the message. This work is divided into a per-message cost and a greater
one-time cost to prevent different types of malicious attackers from decrypting the
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messages.
Crumpled encryption is an encryption that imposes a specific cost per-message.
Imposing a per-message cost prevents any resource-bounded recipient of an encrypted
dataset from performing an unlimited number of decryptions. The total cost of reversing the crumpled encryption grows as more messages are decrypted which prevents
mass decryptions and focuses the target of decryptions to be relevant to investigations. The cost analysis is aided by the extensive work that has recently been done
in computing DoubleSHA256 due to the popularity of Bitcoin [47, 17]. By forcing attackers to compute DoubleSHA256 many times, we can calculate the computational
“work” required by an attacker to decrypt a record. Using electricity cost we can
then convert this into a monetary value. Wright and Varia suggest a cost of $1000 (or
larger) per message to limit investigations. When used alone, crumpled-encryption
could allow for a resource-bounded adversary to decrypt a few messages, potentially
doing harm. We could solve this by increasing the crumpling cost, but that might
make the cost of decryption too high, hindering legitimate investigation. This is
where abraded encryption helps.
Abraded encryption is meant to impose a one-time cost on the decryption of
many messages. This prevents attackers with small resources from decrypting any
records. Generally, the required cost for breaking abrasion is much higher than the
per-message cost required by crumpled encryption, measured in the millions instead
of thousands of dollars. A high initial cost deters illegitimate attackers who may
gain encrypted messages through a data breach rather than through warrants as our
legitimate attacker would do. These attackers (we call malicious attackers) will not
always have the necessary resources required to break the abraded encryption. If an
attacker only wants one message, they will still have to spend millions of dollars. Law
enforcement (our legitimate attacker) will want to break the abraded encryption to
4

decrypt many messages over many investigations, thus amortizing their total cost over
time. After an attacker spends the one-time-cost to break the abraded encryption,
they pay only the crumpling costs for each message.
Both of these encryptions can produce information to aid in breaking the given
key. The extra information is sometimes called a “tag” or a “puzzle.” After a tag is
created, the key is considered to be “abraded” or “crumpled” allowing for retrieval
using the generated tag.
The cost of the abraded encryption is set to ensure that law enforcement can
decrypt it while still being high enough to prevent many attackers from being able
to decrypt messages. For example, if we had an abrasion scheme that cost $1 million
dollars to break, it would not be a significant portion of the budget for the FBI [58],
but many attackers would not be able to spend this cost to start decrypting records.
The threat of a low resource attacker (such as a hacker) gaining records is very
practical. Encrypted records of messaging platforms are not always stored on secure
servers [15] and hacking these servers doesn’t require a lot of resources. Wide-spread
adoption would push the need for abraded encryption even further as there will be
more chance of breach.
The abrasion construction presented by Wright and Varia [58] uses a DiffieHellman key exchange [35] with small primes as public key parameters. The authors use a precomputation attack described by Adrian et al. to measure the cost of
breaking the scheme [23].
Some constructions for exceptional access involve using a public ledger [36], or
requiring physical possession of devices [54]. These are great ideas which we hope can
be composed with the scheme used in this thesis. We provide more details on these
schemes in Chapter 2. Even if governments wish to include key escrow or backdoors,
crumpled and abraded encryption could be applied to the escrowed messages as well.
5

This would decrease the risk of abuse and breach.

1.3

Beneficial side-effects of decryption cost
We have discussed how crumpled encryption rate limits government decryptions

at $1000, but there are also benefits to having any amount required for decryption.
Adding a monetary cost to decryptions has another important effect on tracking
how governments perform investigations. We have many systems to track the flow of
money in corporations such as enterprise software like Concur [8]. These applications
could help expose abuse of gathered records even at lower crumpling costs.
A benefit of abraded encryption over schemes like key escrow is the ability to
easily change keys after a data breach. If law enforcement has a data breach and
attackers recover the work required to break the abraded encryption, the public key
could be changed with no coordination with law enforcement. After the public key is
changed, the stolen private key would be useless for future messages. The abrasion
construction presented in this thesis does not require agreement for public key choice.
Removing this barrier to scheme initialization makes changing the public key much
easier.

1.4

Motivation for a new abrasion construction
Crumpled encryption is already well defined and accomplishes its goals [58], but

there is still room for improvement with the more complex problem of abraded encryption.
Crumpling leverages the recent work done to compute DoubleSHA256 efficiently
to have accurate estimations of cost [58, 47, 17]. Unfortunately, the proposed abrasion
construction did not have the same depth of work backing its cost.

6

The current abrasion scheme (described in Section 1.2) relies on weakened public
key parameters such as primes. Many are skeptical of using primes generated by government agencies. NIST published a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
generator (CSPRNG) which relied on specific group parameters which many believed
to have a backdoor created by the NSA [55]. This backdoor could have been created
by choosing specific primes with algebraic relations that would allow the NSA to predict bits of randomness created by the CSPRNG. An abrasion scheme which is not
susceptible to these backdoors is desirable.
The monetary cost of breaking any given abrasion scheme decreases as hardware
becomes more efficient. To maintain a fixed cost, the parameters of an abrasion
scheme would need to be modified over time to match the efficiency of current hardware. Finding safe parameters to use in these schemes is a difficult problem [19] which
would be exacerbated if the parameters were modified frequently.
More analysis of the original abrasion construction is needed to know whether it
provides security against attackers that only want to retrieve a single message. The
notion of security against this type of malicious attacker is described in Section 5.1 in
Property A. Analyzing this existing construction would require significant knowledge
of modern attacks on public key schemes and is beyond the scope of this thesis. The
original authors of abraded encryption [58] recognized this gap in security and kept
their security proofs modular to allow for improvement.

1.5

Contributions
In this thesis, we address the problems with the existing abrasion scheme. As our

main contribution, we propose a construction that uses cryptographic hash functions
instead of weakened public key parameters. Using hash functions allows us to provide
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provable bounds on its security against a malicious attacker. Cryptographic hash
functions are also much easier to predictably weaken than public key parameters. We
present this main construction is described in Chapter 6.
A second contribution of this thesis is a set of detailed requirements and security
definitions for an abrasion scheme. These are defined in Chapter 5. We also present
a proof of concept of a crumpled encryption library and an example of an integration
of crumpled logging with an email server in Chapter 4.
The abrasion construction presented in this thesis relies on hash functions and
Time/Memory Trade-Offs (TMTOs) to create an abrasion construction that meets
the desired requirements. We review TMTOs in Section 3.1.

1.6

Thesis outline
In Chapter 2, we provide background on the technologies used in this construction

and discuss other solutions similar to ours. Details of preliminaries that we make
extensive use of in this thesis are reviewed in Chapter 3. A small proof-of-concept
implementation of crumpling is presented in Chapter 4. Subsequent chapters focus
solely on abraded encryption. We specify properties, present a generic set of functions,
and define the security of an abrasion scheme in Chapter 5. Our main construction is
presented in Chapter 6 along with some intuition of the statistics involved to compute
the success chance of attackers. The equations needed to calculate the security for the
main construction are derived in Chapter 7 along with a security game and oracle.
We use practical parameters to compute the security and cost of our construction in
Chapter 8. Finally, we sum up our contributions and discuss the future of this work
in Chapter 9.

8

Chapter 2
Related work

In this chapter we discuss constructions that are similar to or used by our construction.
Key escrow is a type of encryption scheme that was introduced in the 1990s. Key
escrow systems perform an encryption that allows authorized individuals such as law
enforcement to decrypt ciphertexts [34].
One construction that seeks to hold investigators accountable is Accountability
of Unreleased Data for Improved Transparency (AUDIT), created by Frankle et al.
This construction utilizes a public ledger to track police investigations. The resulting
publicity is meant to ensure that warrants are properly followed during investigations
[36].
An approach, by Savage, ensures that police have physical access of devices that
they are investigating. This construction uses secure hardware to self-escrow keys
into the device. These keys cannot be read by software and instead require physical
access for some amount of time to be read. Enforcing physical access reduces privacy
violations done over the internet and allows for existing procedures for warrants on
physical evidence to easily apply to digital assets [54].
In 1980, Hellman introduced the concept of using Time/Memory Trade-Offs (TMTOs) to aid in the reversal of cryptographic functions [40]. His work focused on

9

finding a key given only the ciphertext of the symmetric encryption scheme DES
(Data Encryption Standard) [48]. These TMTOs can help reverse any cryptographic
function, including cryptographic hashes. The process of reversing these functions
is called cryptanalysis. Hellman’s original work showed that stored precomputation
could be used to speed up later cryptanalysis. This is where the name “time/memory
trade-off” comes from, as it trades off storage space (memory) in order to reduce the
time of later decryptions. One common form of a TMTO is called a “Rainbow Table”
[50]. Readers may know this as a method to reverse password hashes. TMTOs will
be further discussed in Section 3.1.
Abraded and crumpled encryption are similar to time-lock puzzles. Time-lock
puzzles impose a time-cost for decryption or proof [52]. Abraded and crumpled encryption differ as they are not meant to enforce a time requirement, but rather a work
requirement, measured in dollars. Specifically, time-lock puzzles generally try to find
inherently serialized problems, while abraded and crumpled decryptions can be done
in parallel.
Abraded encryption is similar to asymmetric encryption, where many have a public
key and can encrypt, but only those with the private key can decrypt. Asymmetric
encryption has a long history and is used by many systems today. An early example
of public key encryption is RSA, created by Rivest et al. [51].
We utilize a technique known as secret sharing, first invented simultaneously by
Shamir and Blakley [56, 28]. Secret sharing allows some fraction m of n total “shares”
to decrypt a message. We review secret sharing in Section 3.2.

10

Chapter 3
Preliminaries

In this chapter we provide more depth on technical schemes that we use in our
main construction. We first review TMTOs in Section 3.1. Then, we discuss secret
sharing in Section 3.2.

3.1

Time/Memory Trade-offs (TMTOs)
Before our construction can be discussed, readers must have some basic knowledge

of how a TMTO can be used for cryptanalysis. This section also defines some of the
symbols used in equations throughout the paper.
TMTOs can help reverse cryptographic functions such as encryption or hash functions. TMTOs are generic and can be used for any cryptographic functions. The main
construction in this thesis uses TMTOs to reverse hash functions. Throughout the
thesis, we use the terms “preimage” and “hash result” (sometimes shortened to just
“hash”) while discussing how TMTOs work. A preimage is an input to a hash function
and a hash result is the output of a hash function.
A TMTO “attack” is separated into a precomputation (“offline”) phase and a
decryption (“online”) phase. In the precomputation phase, the target hash function
is computed many times, but only some of the results are stored. The stored results
are sorted so that they can be efficiently searched during the online phase to reverse
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hashes. The stored precomputation of a TMTO can be reused to reverse many hashes.
In order to reverse hashes that we computed but did not store, we compute hashes
in chains. We also use a reduction function which transforms the output of the hash
function into a valid input for the hash function. This allows us to create these chains
by choosing a starting point and computing the hash function and reduction function
repeatedly. Chains computed for a specific hash function and reduction function are
stored as “rows” in a TMTO table.
Equation 3.1 shows the structure of a chain. The reduction function is represented
as R(·) and the hash function as h(·). Each starting point of a chain (pi,0 ) is a distinct

and valid input to h(·). (R ◦ h)j is a function composition of R and h R(h(·)) ,
composed with itself j times.

pi,0
=pi,0

→R(h(pi,0 ))

→(R ◦ h)2 (pi,0 )

→...

→(R ◦ h)t (pi,0 )

→pi,1

→pi,2

→...

→pi,t

There are m chains in each table (0 ≤ i < m). Only values

m
P

(3.1)

(pi,0 , pi,t ) are saved

i=0

from the precomputation. All other values are discarded to save storage space. This
means that the storage space required for a table is proportional to m. The total
amount of work (w) put into the table is proportional to w = m ∗ t. This work is
measured in invocations of the hash function h(·).
When reversing a certain hash result, c, where h(x) = c, we first apply the reduc
tion function to c R(c) and check if the result is stored as an endpoint in our table.
If this value doesn’t exist in our table, we apply the hash function and the reduction

function again R(h(R(c))) and check if this result is an endpoint of the table. The
hash function and reduction function are repeatedly computed until we find a pi,t in

the table that matches a value computed on c pi,t = (R ◦ h)j (R(c)) . The chain is
12

then recomputed from the stored starting point pi,0 to find a preimage that generates

the given hash (R ◦ h)t−j−1 (pi,0 ) = pi,t−j−1 , H(pi,t−j−1 ) = c .
Because of hash collisions, we may find a preimage (p0 ) such that h(p0 ) = h(p) =
c, p0 6= p where p is the “correct” preimage for c. This collision is a type of false
alarm and adds to the cost of our online phase. There is also a chance that h(p) was
never computed in the table. The chance that h(p) is in the table is called the table’s
probability of success, labeled as Pr[Stable ].
Hellman proves that the cost of false alarms can’t increase online cost per table
(Ttable ) by more than 50% [40]. This means that our search cost for a TMTO table
will be Ttable ≤ t ∗ 1.5 where there each chain in the table is of length t.
To compute this table, we choose a number of starting points (pi ) in the preimage
space such that ∀i ∈ {0, 1, ...m − 1}, pi ∈ {0, 1, ...N − 1} where N is the number of
inputs to the hash function. Each starting point is distinct, as using the same starting
point would result in an identical chain and add no value to the table. We store a pi

with the resulting end point (R ◦ h)t (pi ) in the table to represent each chain.
There is a chance that two or more of these rows (chains) may merge at some point,
causing the rest of the chain to be duplicated: (R◦h)y (pi ) = (R◦h)u (pk ), i 6= k. Figure
3.1 shows an example of two chains merging. These chain merges become more likely
as the table becomes larger. Chain merges cause stored TMTO precomputations
to become less effective as m (the size of the table) increases. In other words, the
success Pr[Stable ] increases sublinearly with the work put into the table w. This
problem has motivated most of the innovation in the field of TMTO constructions.
The most complex parts of the main construction presented in this thesis are designed
to overcome the diminishing returns of TMTO constructions.An attacker that does
not compute a table to reverse h(x) (a tableless attacker ) does not encounter these
merges which gives them an advantage over the table attacker.
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Figure 3.1: Example of a chain merge in a TMTO
Hellman developed a method to combat merging chains by computing multiple
tables (l tables) on the same hash function h(·). Each table uses a distinct reduction
function (Ri (·), i ∈ {0, 1, ..., l − 1}). These tables may have collisions, but their chains
do not merge because they use different reduction functions. Using multiple tables
greatly increases the chance of success of a TMTO solution, but also increases our
online time as we now need to compute a different function on the target hash for each
of the tables. Because we must search multiple tables, our online cost (T ) becomes
T = l ∗ Ttable = l ∗ t ∗ 1.5. Computing these tables also multiplies our storage space
required (M ) by l, M = l ∗ m.
When we can reverse a target hash using the stored TMTO precomputation we
call this a “success.” We derive the probability of success for Hellman’s TMTO in
Appendix A for any given TMTO parameters (l, m, t). This probability of success is
shown in Equation 3.2.

Pr[STMTO ] = 1 − exp

l
t
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u=0

2

!
1 − e−u
du
u

(3.2)

3.1.1

Optimal trade-off parameters

The most “efficient” trade-off occurs when m = t = l, where m is the number of
rows stored in each table, t is the length of each chain, and l is the number of tables
computed [40]. In this case, efficiency is measured as the sum of the rows required
(M ) and the online compute time (T ) over the number of invocation of the hash
function (m ∗ t ∗ l).
Many TMTO authors focus on analyzing tables computed to exactly N invocations of the hash function, where N is the input space of the hash function h(·) [42].
1

Using the optimal efficiency trade-off, this means our parameters are m = t = l = N 3 .
Stopping at at N invocations strikes a decent balance between gaining a significant
success chance and losing too much work to chain merges. While more careful adjustments of these parameters may yield a better trade off for abrasion, we use this
2

“standard” trade-off as a guide for the parameters in our scheme (m = t = l = N 3 ).

3.1.2

TMTO improvements

A variant of Hellman’s TMTO solution uses a technique called “Distinguished
Point tables” (DP tables) in order to reduce the number of merging chains in TMTOs.
DP tables were originally suggested by Ronald Rivest [33]. The distinguished points
method was formalized and improved by Borst et al [29]. Borst el al. also introduced
the notion of perfect tables in the same paper. A perfect table is a TMTO construction
that removes merging chains during precomputation. This reduces the number of false
alarms and the size of the table.
An innovation by Avoine et al. reduces the cost of false alarms using a method
called “checkpoints.” In this method, extra information is added to the table to reduce
the online cost to check for false alarms [24].
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We did not consider DP tables or checkpoints for this construction. Instead we
simply prove that a basic TMTO can meet the requirements of an abrasion function
and leave details to be completed by an attacker. Using better TMTO constructions
can only strengthen our scheme as we measure the security of our scheme by comparing the efficiency of an attacker that builds a TMTO against an attacker who does
not compute any tables.
Oechslin created Rainbow Tables in 2003 [50] which uses a small number of tables
with rotating reduction functions. We show the success probability of this construction in Section 6.2. Our main construction does not use rainbow tables as it is difficult
to compute the probability of success for large values of N , which is required for our
scheme to impose practical initial costs. There is far more research on Hellman tables,
ensuring that our analysis is more robust.

3.2

Secret Sharing
Secret sharing, first invented simultaneously by Shamir and Blakley [56, 28], is a

cryptographic function that encrypts a secret k by generating n different “shares.”
Any subset of these n shares (of fixed size m) can be used to derive the secret.
One of the first secret sharing algorithms used polynomial interpolation [56]. Each
share is an evaluation of the polynomial at a different point. The polynomial is of
(m − 1) order and n evaluations of the polynomial are generated. Any polynomial of
(m − 1) order can be perfectly interpolated with any m different points. This means
that any m of the n generated shares can be used to recreate the polynomial. We
then set the secret as the y-intercept (or another, secret evaluation) of the polynomial
so that any party with m shares can find this secret through interpolation. The
arithmetic for these polynomial evaluations is done over a prime field to ensure it is
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more secure.
In our main construction, we use secret sharing in a generic way. This generic
secret sharing scheme has two functions: SSGen, a function that generates shares for
a secret, and SSDecrypt, a function that finds the secret using the shares.
SSGen takes a secret and scheme parameters m, n as input. The function creates
and returns a set of n shares, labeled s (|s| = n). Many secret sharing schemes also
generate a ciphertext c [43].

s, c ← SSGen(k, m, n), m ≤ n

SSDecrypt is a function to retrieve a secret k. The function accepts the ciphertext
generated by SSGen and a set of shares. This set of shares (s0 ) is a subset of s of size
m (|s0 | = m, s0 ⊂ s).
k ← SSDecrypt(c, s0 )
We use secret sharing in our main construction in Section 6.3. Secret sharing
improves the success chance of our legitimate attacker in our abrasion scheme. The
legitimate attacker’s probability of success with secret sharing is derived in Section
6.3.10.
An alternative to secret sharing for our main construction is described in Section
6.3.9. This improves the performance of our scheme, but we do not analyze the
security when using this alternative method.
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Chapter 4
Crumpling implementation

In this section we present a proof of concept of crumpled-encryption in C and
modify an email server to use it. We chose to install crumpled encryption into Postfix
[18], which exists on 34.31% of email servers as of 2018 [16].
Crumpled encryption is meant to impose a per-message cost on an attacker that
wants to decrypt records. After a key has been crumpled, any attacker must compute
many hash functions in order to retrieve the key. The number of hash function
invocations is variable depending on how many possible inputs to the hash function
there are. Knowing the expected number of hash invocations, we can determine the
monetary cost of this decryption using known hardware efficiency rates for Bitcoin
mining [17]. The monetary cost is the cost of electricity spent by this adversary.
This implementation mostly follows the construction outlined in the original abrasion/crumpling paper [58]. A random public nonce is added to prohibit TMTOs from
being used to reduce the cost of many decryptions. Adding this requires us to store
a tag to reverse crumple-encrypted messages. This tag stores information like the
nonce to ensure decryption is possible.
The header file for the crumpled-encryption library (crumple.h) includes a number
of declarations. One of these declarations is the crumpled message struct shown in
Listing 4.1. This struct stores information needed to recover a message, including
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the ciphertext. A serialized version of this struct is stored in the Postfix logs. The
function in Listing 4.2 performs the actual crumpled-encryption on a message and
stores it in a struct. A key can be crumpled by providing it in place of a message.
The library provides a method for writing the structs to log files using file descriptors,
shown in Listing 4.3.
Listing 4.1: Crumpled message struct
struct crumpled_msg{
unsigned char* enc_msg; // the ciphertext of the message (
,→ crumple-encrypted)
unsigned char keygen_hash[32]; // hash to break
unsigned char nonce[32]; // nonce to prohibit TMTOs
int bits; // difficulty of the puzzle
};

Listing 4.2: Crumpled encryption function
void crumple_enc(unsigned char* message, struct crumpled_msg* cmsg);

Listing 4.3: Serialize crumpled struct function
void serialize_crumpled_msg(FILE* fd, struct crumpled_msg* cmsg);
In crumple.c, the crumpled-encryption library implementation, OpenSSL was used
to perform the cryptographic functions [13]. The “getrandom” Linux system call was
also used to generate randomness [10].
A small executable is shown in Listing 4.4 which uses the crumpled encryption
library to do a single crumpled-encryption. This takes a plaintext and a difficulty as
input and writes out the serialized crumpled ciphertext.
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Listing 4.4: Crumple encryption binary
// crumple_enc.c
int main(int argc, char **argv){
int num_bits = atoi(argv[2]); // read in the difficulty
unsigned char* text = argv[1]; // read in the plaintext
struct crumpled_msg cmsg; // initialize a struct
cmsg.bits = num_bits; // set the difficulty
crumple_enc(text, &cmsg); // call crumpled encryption library
serialize_crumpled_msg(stdout,&cmsg); // write the crumpled
,→ encryption out
}
This binary is used by a script which is called by Postfix. This script is shown
in Listing 4.5. It takes in an email from Postfix and crumple encrypts the TO and
FROM fields in a log file before sending it along the Postfix message pipeline.
Listing 4.5: Crumpled logging script
#!/bin/bash
# this script is stored in /opt/crumple/crumplelog_postfix.sh

# take note of the date
received_date=$(date)
# need to call the binary that we created that will crumple-encrypt a
,→ single message
crumple_enc_binary=/opt/crumple/crumple_enc
# compute the crumpled encryptions
# $3 is the FROM field, $4 is the TO field.
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# The 50 here is the difficulty (in bits)
from_crumpled=$($crumple_enc_binary $3 50)
to_crumpled=$($crumple_enc_binary $4 50)
# write the crumple-encrypted message to the log
printf "email:%s:\n" $received_date >> /var/log/crumpled_email.log
printf "\tfrom:\n\t\t%s\n\tto:\n\t\t%s\n\n" $from_crumpled
,→ $to_crumpled >> /var/log/crumpled_email_headers.log
# allow email to continue through Postfix (reach receiver)
/usr/sbin/sendmail $@

exit $?
We make two edits in the Postfix configuration file shown in Listing 4.6. These
edits modify Postfix to crumpled encrypt logs.
Listing 4.6: Postfix configuration for crumple encrypted logging
# here are excerpts from the Postfix configuration file: /etc/postfix/
,→ master.cf
...
# This line pipes smtp traffic through a custom filter
smtp inet n - n - - smtpd -o content_filter=crumplelog-pipe
...
# This line creates the custom filter and points it at our crumpling
,→ script
crumplelog-pipe unix - n n - - pipe
flags=Rq user=vmuser argv=/opt/crumple/crumplelog_postfix.sh ,→ oi -f ${sender} ${recipient}
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An online tutorial aided the creation of this crumpling bash script and modifications to the Postfix configuration [7].
Listing 4.7 is an example of a crumple encrypted log as generated by the crumpled
logging script. This examples shows a log file with the crumple-encrypted details of
a single email.
Listing 4.7: Crumple encrypted log
email:Mon Apr 22 20:05:12 PDT 2019:
from:
|bits:50|hash:e89f0b6e70f8d3dadae77963a835b55b-62
,→ ef62a6f7f9774a8a4044d792a25c25|ciphertext:78
,→ a6760f57d49f7631a7f6d9d4482ec0-02366
,→ ddcfb2bab6c3a39eadb4d5dc5a8|nonce:
,→ ab08bf410892fe5f54b3ced722d652fc,→ ef43f4b283343d0474a6e93c2aa91dfd|
to:
|bits:50|hash:e74e93d351e245101375741d70f1b739,→ e465e4f0ce4926e184bf6a0468fa494b|ciphertext:89
,→ a2251e429245a8ec505c33d0b93071-9
,→ e9aadb36587a3dcb57060d3f11941f4|nonce:142
,→ e792ceb6cd4c8b4017355390a25e7,→ c944412fc72edd12ae4038aefc3804bc|
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Chapter 5
Abrasion description

Abrasion is an encryption scheme invented by Wright and Varia [58]. We reviewed
abrasion in Section 1.2. Abraded encryption imposes a large one-time cost on the
decryption of many messages. An initial cost prevents an attacker who doesn’t have
adequate resources from decrypting even a single record. This cost is created using
puzzles which require computational work to solve.
In this chapter, we’ll first describe in detail properties that an abrasion function
should accomplish in Section 5.1. We describe how to determine the security of an
abrasion scheme in Section 5.2. Then we describe what the top-level functions (API)
of an abrasion scheme should be in Section 5.3.

5.1

Properties of abrasion schemes
In order to discuss abrasion functionality effectively, we present desirable proper-

ties of abrasion functions in categories: Ideal, Relaxed, and Optional.

5.1.1

Ideal properties

These are properties that an ideal abrasion construction should do. Current constructions do not achieve all of these properties.
Property A - Cost to decrypt 1 message is equal to the cost to decrypt n messages.
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Description: Our legitimate attacker will want to decrypt a large number
of messages (n messages). Other, malicious, attackers may benefit from
decrypting only a single message. For example, a resource-bound hacker
might retrieve some encrypted records in a security breach. Abrasion
should prevent this hacker from retrieving a single message, just as a
strong encryption would. Ideally, the function would require the same
cost for decrypting any number of messages. We refer to this cost as I
for “initial cost.” This relationship is shown in Figure 5.1.
Property B - Concrete lower bound on cost to decrypt 1 message.
Description: An abrasion construction should ensure that an attacker
has to spend a one time cost (I) to start decrypting messages. Ideally,
this lower bound is not probabilistic. When the work spent (w) is less
than some fixed amount (w < I), the adversary should have negligible
(2−128 ) chance of decrypting any records. This property is also shown by
the step-functions probabilities in Figure 5.1
Property C - Many can use a public key to encrypt.
Description: There are many companies that provide messaging services
containing important information for investigations. We want each of
these entities to be able to use abrasion to encrypt their records without
having the key to decrypt each other’s records. This is a property that
many public key schemes have. Public keys can also be changed to ensure that different parties can require work done for different messages if
desired. A real-world application would be if multiple countries used this
to secure their digital evidence. We wouldn’t want the precomputation
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Figure 5.1: Message decryption chance in an ideal abrasion scheme
done by Australian law enforcement to allow decryption of American
records or vice-versa.
Property D - Private key can be stored for future use.
Description: We want a legitimate attacker to be able to store a key
to be used in future investigations. This motivates our construction to
use TMTOs in order to be able to save a representation of the initial
precomputation for later look up.
Property E - Predictable cost.
Description: The cost to decrypt is easily calculated and is based on
25

cryptographic functions with rigorous cost analysis.
Property F - Low cost per-message.
Description: After precomputation for a given public key, all future
abraded key retrievals have very low cost.

5.1.2

Relaxed properties

These are properties from the ideal section that have been relaxed so we can analyze schemes that come close but are not perfectly ideal. Specifically, these represent
Property A and Property B in a more attainable way.
Property G - Cost to decrypt 1 message is close to the cost to decrypt n messages
Description: Having these two costs be equal is ideal, as noted in Property A, but this is difficult to achieve using real-world constructions.
This property relaxes the requirement of Property A. This relaxation is
illustrated in Figure 5.2 by the malicious attacker (red line) rising earlier than the legitimate attacker (blue line). In order to stay “close” to
the malicious attacker, we require our legitimate attacker’s work to scale
sublinearly with the number of messages decrypted. This relaxed property defines the “security” of an abrasion function. An abrasion scheme
is secure against a malicious attacker if they must spend a large fraction
( R1 ) of the work that a legitimate attacker spends. We formally define
this security in Section 5.2.2. In this work, our legitimate attacker uses
R = 13.2 times the amount of work to decrypt 245 messages compared
to an illegitimate attacker’s cost to decrypt 1 message. To put this in
perspective, with only a crumpling scheme, an attacker who decrypts
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245 messages spends 245 times the amount of work as an attacker that
decrypts 1 message.
Property H - Probabilistic lower bound
Description: This relaxation of Property B allows the scheme to allow a
small chance for a message to be decrypted with small cost. This means
that at w = I our illegitimate attacker has an  chance of decryption.
This  is larger than 2−128 but still very close to zero. For this work, we
use an  of 2−45 . This relaxation is shown by the “s-curve” (or sigmoid)
shape of the lines in Figure 5.2.
The differences between Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the relaxation of Property
G and Property H. These two relaxed properties are more formally defined in Section
5.2.
5.1.3

Optional properties

These are desirable properties that improve the scheme, but aren’t required for
an abrasion function.
Property I - Freedom of key choice.
Description: Anyone can initialize the abrasion scheme and assure others
that it is not compromised. Public keys for some asymmetric encryption
can possibly have backdoors [55]. An abrasion function would be stronger
if it were resistant to backdoors that would allow an attacker to subvert
the initial cost I. For a scheme without this property, we believe that
multiparty computation could be used instead [60, 38]. Using multiparty
computation requires mass coordination and can have backdoors if they
have a vulnerability [37] so it is not desirable.
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Figure 5.2: Message decryption chance in a realistic abrasion scheme
Property J - Low code impact on existing applications
Description: If existing programs can be modified easily, there is less of
a chance of security breach due to programmer error
Property K - Non-transferable private key.
Description: Private key is hard to steal from a facility. In our case, the
key is very large in size, requiring exfiltration of petabytes of information.
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5.1.4

Practical abrasion

In order for an abrasion scheme to be practical, it must be able to fulfill requirements while not imposing a large cost on key storage and per-message decryption.
We calculate these costs for our final construction in Chapter 8.
To further analyze a given abrasion scheme, we look at the budget of law enforcement agencies and the resources of malicious attackers. Over 2017 and 2018, the FBI
requested almost $60 million for projects to solve the “Going Dark” problem [31, 45].
To compare this with the work that a malicious attacker could spend, we look
at the value of data and the resources of attackers. If a hacker doesn’t have enough
resources, or if there isn’t enough value to gain by breaking an abrasion scheme,
their malicious activity will be prevented. Abrasion can’t prevent attackers with
large resources from decrypting records, but we provide examples of smaller attacks
that could be prevented. The average value of stored PII for a data-driven company
ranges from $3.6 million to $1 billion depending on the size of the company [57]. A
breach doesn’t usually result in all of a company’s records being released. As a more
specific example, a report showed that an individual data seller on the black market
could make $2 million over 4 years by selling stolen credit cards [41]. As for the
resources of cybercriminals, ransomware is easy to track because of public payments.
Cryptolocker, a ransomware operation, resulted in $3 million in payments [1]. A
smaller cybercrime operation profits around $50,000, but there are larger operations
that profit over $1 billion [46].
In Chapter 8, we show that our abrasion construction can prevent attackers with
less than $3 million from decrypting any records, while staying within the FBI’s
“Going Dark” budget. While there are larger cybercriminal operations that could
break any abrasion scheme, these statistics should convince the reader that there are
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attackers that would be thwarted by our practical abraded encryption scheme.

5.2

Security Definitions
In this section, we describe how to evaluate the security of an abrasion scheme.

First, we give an idea for the threat model we plan to protect against in Section 5.2.1.
Next we formally define security definitions based on this threat model in Section
5.2.2. In Chapter 7, we will use these definitions to evaluate the security of our final
construction.

5.2.1

Threat model

In this section we describe our threat model for this scheme. To satisfy Property
G and Property H we look at the probability of success of an adversary that simply
wants to decrypt a single message. If the abraded encryption scheme meets these
properties, this adversary should have to spend a proportional amount of work to our
legitimate attacker. This legitimate attacker will store a private key for the abrasion
scheme, whereas the malicious adversary does not store any of their computation.
To quantify this, we will be bounding the work done by a malicious adversary to
decrypt one message. We will compare this to the work required for our legitimate
attacker to derive a private key that can recover n messages. We calculate this
comparison as a ratio shown in Equation 5.1.
A ratio is more useful than a difference between these costs (computed by subtraction). An insecure scheme could impose a fixed difference between a legitimate and
malicious attacker by adjusting I. For example, an abrasion scheme could achieve a
difference of $1 million by requiring $1 million for a legitimate adversary and $0 for
a malicious adversary. It is more difficult for schemes to achieve a low ratio and in
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our construction, the ratio does not change significantly as I is adjusted.

Ratio(R) =

legitimate work for n messages
malicious work for 1 message

(5.1)

For example, if the ratio is 2, a legitimate attacker has to spend twice as much
work as a malicious attacker.
We also assume that this adversary has recovered an entire abrasion-encrypted
database of g records while still only needing to reverse one.
The term “legitimate attacker” is left partially undefined to allow individual abrasion schemes to define this. In our scheme, the legitimate attacker precomputes a
TMTO, which adds to their work required. We also leave “work” to be defined by
the scheme. In our construction, “work” is the number of invocations of the hash
function. We convert this work into dollars in Chapter 8.

5.2.2

Security Definitions

Definition 1. -n-g-R-Security
Let wlegitimate be the work spent by a legitimate attacker to have a 1 −  chance of
solving n different abrasion tags.
Let wmalicious be the work spent by any attacker to have an  chance of solving 1
record, given g different abrasion tags.
w

An abrasion scheme is -n-g-R-secure if R ≤ wlegitimate .
malicious

Definition 2. λ-R-Security
An abrasion scheme is λ-R-secure if it is -n-g-R-secure where  = 2−λ , n = 2λ ,
and g = 2λ .
We present Definition 2 in order to compress the idea of Definition 1 to make it
31

easier to discuss. λ represents the idea of “very large” and “very small” parameters.
An ideal scheme that achieves Property A and Property B would be 128-1-secure.
Our construction instead meets Property G and Property H using a smaller λ and
larger R.
We leave the cost I out of this security definition. Our scheme is easily tweaked
to achieve different values of I with the same ratio (R). The value I may also vary
from year to year as hardware efficiency increases.
Because there are many choices that this adversary could make, we need to find
a way to calculate the bounds on their probability of success at any given amount of
work. In Chapter 7 we look at an adversary that has access to a very powerful oracle
function to show that our main construction is secure.
We evaluate our scheme as being 45-13.2-secure for I ≈ $3 million in Chapter 8.
This means that, with work below I (w < I), an adversary only has a 2−45 chance to
successfully decrypt 1 message, given 245 messages. This security is sufficient to deter
many low-resource attackers while still not overwhelming the cost of government.

5.3

Abrasion scheme functions
An abrasion scheme is defined as a collection of functions used to facilitate abraded

encryption. We will list them in this section.

5.3.1

Abrasion scheme initialization

pk ← AbrasionSchemeInitialization(Q, λ, R)
The initialization function takes a cost parameter Q and security parameters λ, R.
It returns an abrasion public key (pk) and may generate public parameters for use in
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other functions of the scheme. This cost Q is distinct from I (the initial cost) as I
will change as hardware becomes more efficient. Given specific hardware, Q should
be proportional to I. In our main construction, Q is the number of invocations of the
hash function. This initialization function is deceiving as, for our main construction,
we calculate R using other parameters from the scheme and acceptable values for R
are found through trial and error.

5.3.2

Abrasion tag generation

a ← AbradeKey(pk, k)
To perform an abraded encryption, we “abrade” the key given to us (k), then
use k for the symmetric encryption of a message. To abrade the key, we compute
an abrasion tag (a) and present it to law enforcement along with encrypted records
upon warrant. k itself is not be given to law enforcement. The tag (a) is breakable
for an abrasion private key (sk) computed using pk. This tag allows an attacker to
retrieve k after performing the initial cost of computing sk.
Messaging service providers will use this function to abrade their keys used to store
records. We call the applications that compute abrasion tags as “clients.” Generally
in client-server schemes, the client does less work, similar to the application that
performs the abraded encryption. We do not have the notion of a “server” in abrasion
schemes.

5.3.3

Abrasion private key generation

sk ← AbrasionPrivateKeyGeneration(pk)
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This scheme will generate a private key based on a public key. Deriving this
private key is intended to take R ∗ Q work to compute.

5.3.4

Abraded key retrieval

k ← AbradedKeyRetrieval(sk, a)
Using an abrasion private key sk, this function will retrieve the abraded key k
associated with an abrasion tag a. If our scheme is secure there is almost no chance
of any attacker reversing k from a without first spending Q work. This notion of
security was defined earlier in this section and is required to meet Property G and
Property H.
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Chapter 6
Abrasion constructions

In this chapter we will introduce our main construction in Section 6.3. But first,
we introduce simpler, but insecure, abrasion constructions to help the reader understand the concept of a hash-based abrasion scheme. These simpler constructions are
presented in Sections 6.1 and 6.3.1. We explain why these constructions fail to meet
our requirements for an abrasion function in Section 6.2.

6.1

A simple (but insecure) hash-based abrasion scheme
In this section, we will show the reader how a simple hash-based abrasion scheme

could work. This scheme is not secure, but introduces concepts that are used in more
secure schemes. We define a secure scheme as one that meets our security definitions
defined in Section 5.2.2.
We can see from Property D and Property F that we will need a way to allow
our legitimate attacker to compress precomputation into a “private key” that we can
store and reuse. We will use hash functions and TMTOs to achieve this.
To ensure our scheme costs millions of dollars, we must do many hash computations. Without TMTOs, storing the results of all these computations would take
zettabytes of storage. This would be impractical and means our construction must
accommodate a legitimate attacker that computes a TMTO.
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A malicious attacker will forego TMTO creation to decrypt a single message
quickly. Because of this, we refer to a malicious attacker as a tableless attacker
and a legitimate attacker as a table attacker.
TMTOs can be used to reverse hash results. This means that our legitimate
adversary can reverse hashes we store in the abrasion tag to recover the preimage. To
allow for decryption, the hash function’s input space must be restricted. A full sized
hash function is computationally intractable to reverse, even with TMTOs A smaller
search space is possible to iterate through with some cost. We measure the cost by
calculating the number of hash function computations needed to reverse the abrasion
tag.
To ensure that reversing a preimage will allow the attacker to defeat the puzzle,
we store a “weakened” hash result of a nonce. An attacker can then reverse the hash
function to retrieve this nonce. We use this nonce to encrypt the key and store the
ciphertext in the abrasion tag. We call this process “abrading” the key.
We assume that hash functions are random oracles. Random oracles will deterministically give us truly random bits. The output of a random oracles can only
be reversed if the exact preimage is guessed again. Assuming this property makes
security assumptions easier to prove and is a commonly used model [26].

To create a weakened hash, we will use a strong hash function Hs (·) and reduce
the size of the unknown input space. This strong hash has a large, deterministic,
truly random output ≈ 256-bits. Reducing the input size is done by feeding the hash
function a public key pk concatenated with a short random nonce x. The length of
the nonce dictates the initial cost of the scheme.
We now describe this scheme (labeled as “SingleHash”) using the interfaces declared in Section 5.3.
$

An assignment of the form: r ←
− {0, 1}k is a random assignment of r from the set
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of all bit-strings of size k.
We use a symmetric encryption scheme (Enc, Dec), such that:

c = Enc(k,m)

m = Dec(k,c)

6.1.1

Abrasion scheme initialization

Algorithm 1 pk ← SingleHash::AbrasionSchemeInitialization(Q, λ, R)
$

pk ←
− {0, 1}b
N ←Q

N is used as a parameter for other functions in this scheme. It defines the size of
the weakened hash function input space. Setting this equal to Q will ensure that our
initial cost I for this scheme is proportional to Q. The bit length of pk (b) is large
(≈ 256-bits) so that it is difficult to compute a TMTO that solves multiple abrasion
schemes with different pk.

6.1.2

Abrasion tag generation

Algorithm 2 a ← SingleHash::AbradeKey(k, pk)
$

x←
− {0, 1, ..., N − 1}
a ← {ah , ac } =← {Hs (pk||x), Enc(x, k)}

x is the nonce used to encrypt the abraded key k. x is discarded after this
computation.
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6.1.3

Abrasion private key generation

Algorithm 3 sk ← SingleHash::AbrasionPrivateKeyGeneration(pk)
sk ← BuildTMTO(Hs (pk||·) mod N )

The legitimate attacker now computes a TMTO on the cryptographic function
h(·) where h(x) = Hs (pk||x) mod N, x ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}. This TMTO is the private
key sk. We label the function that builds this table as “BuildTMTO,” which takes
a cryptographic function and builds a TMTO to reverse it. The process of creating
a TMTO is described in section 3.1. We calculate the cost of a legitimate attacker
assuming that they use Hellman’s TMTO [40].

6.1.4

Abraded key retrieval

Algorithm 4 k ← SingleHash::AbradedKeyRetrieval(sk, (ah , ac ))
x ← Lookup(sk, ah )
k ← Dec(x, ac )

After precomputation, they will be able to reverse many hash results by performing
a lookup in the TMTO. This lookup takes substantially less work than precomputation.
Unfortunately, our table (legitimate) attacker needs to waste a lot of work. This is
because, in order to build a TMTO table that will retrieve close to 100% of messages,
much of the work will be duplicated due to merging chains in the TMTO tables.
Chain merges are described in Section 6.2. The probability of success using a TMTO
to reverse a single hash function levels off at ≈ 86%. The malicious (tableless)
adversary does not need to waste their work creating this table, and therefore spends

38

far less work. Because of the large difference in work, this simple abraded encryption
therefore does not satisfy Property G. We will explore this problem in Section 6.2.

6.2

TMTO success chance
To ensure the tableless (malicious) adversary has to spend resources similar to an

attacker that computes a table, we will need to analyze the success chances of various
TMTO strategies.
We derive the success chance of Hellman tables in Appendix A.

Figure 6.1: Probability of success of different TMTO solutions (up to ≈ 86%) vs
tableless approach, N = 225
We have included the success chance of Hellman’s TMTO solution in Figure 6.1.
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As can be seen from this graph, the probability of success levels off as more work is
put into the table. This gives us diminishing returns as we put more work into the
table. If we used a single hash as an abrasion function, this drop off of efficiency
would severely limit a table attacker compared to the tableless attacker.
The probability of success of a rainbow table was described by Oechslin in 2003
[50]. The success chance of a rainbow table attack is graphed against work in Figure
6.1. We can see that rainbow tables perform slightly better than Hellman’s TMTO
solution. Rainbow tables were not evaluated as a method for our legitimate attacker
as Hellman tables are much better understood and there is a greater depth of research
into them [25].
We did not measure the success probability of tables built with distinguished
points (DPs). We discuss DP tables in Section 3.1.
Figure 6.1 graphs the success chance of a tableless attacker that only has one
abrasion tag. When an attacker has multiple abrasion tags, they have an even greater
chance of breaking a single message. This is because all abrasion tags share the
same weakened hash functions. This increases the chance of an attacker recovering a
preimage while iterating through the input space by allowing them to check if a hash
result solves any of the abrasion tags available to them. Our main construction in
Section 6.3 is provably secure against an adversary with many abrasion tags and we
calculate the security ratio (R) of our main construction in Chapter 8.

6.3

Main construction
In this section, we first describe the intuition in for our main construction Section

6.3.1. We then formally present the main construction in Section 6.3.2.
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6.3.1

Intuition

The graph in Section 6.2 shows that using a single weakened hash function to
create an abrasion scheme results in an insecure scheme. With one hash function,
a tableless attacker gains a reasonable success chance with less work than a table
attacker. Using multiple distinct hash functions can modify the success chance of
these different attackers. In this section we will introduce two insecure schemes,
labeled as: “MultipleSame” and “MultipleDifferent.” These schemes will illustrate
methods and statistics that our main construction uses in Section 6.3.2.
First we examine what happens when we modify the “SingleHash” scheme to use
multiple hashes on the same preimage (nonce ‘x’). This scheme is called “MultipleSame” as we hash the same preimage multiple times. We do not describe the functions
for “MultipleDifferent” that do not vary much from the “SingleHash” scheme such as
the function for initialization.
The “AbradeKey” function now generates a modified abrasion tag. Assume Y
is a scheme parameter generated during initialization. Y will determine how many
distinct hash functions there are.
Algorithm 5 a ← MultipleSame::AbradeKey(k, pk)
$

x←
− {0, 1, ..., N − 1}
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, ahi ← Hs (pk + i||x) mod N
ac ← Enc(x, k)
a ← {{∀i, ahi }, ac }

The retrieval function is similar to the simple scheme in Algorithm 4. The difference is that now the attacker has multiple ahi and can choose which one to reverse.
Because we add i to pk while computing Hs (·), each hash function is distinct. This
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means that our table attacker can build multiple TMTO solutions. These TMTOs
will have no collisions or merges with each other because they are computing distinct
cryptographic functions. Because they only have to reverse one of the hashes, their
probability of success increases dramatically. With a large value for Y , we can boost
an attacker’s success chance to around 100%.

Figure 6.2: Tableless vs table attacker, MultipleSame construction. Y = 5, N = 225
Unfortunately, our tableless attacker retrieves the nonce very quickly as well, making this scheme insecure. As shown in Figure 6.2, our tableless attacker immediately
has a significant chance to defeat the abrasion puzzle with very low work. A malicious
adversary could get lucky and decrypt a record with a small amount of work in the
“MultipleSame” scheme.
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A different way to modify the scheme is to use different preimages for the distinct
hashes. We concatenate all the preimages and hash it to derive a key. We will use
this key to encrypt our abraded key. Because this key is never stored, we call it the
ephemeral key (e). We call this modified scheme “MultipleDifferent,” because we use
different preimages to compute multiple hash results.
Algorithm 6 a ← MultipleDifferent::AbradeKey(k, pk)
$

∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, xi ←
− {0, 1, ..., N − 1}
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, ahi ← Hs (pk + i||xi ) mod N
e ← Hs (x0 ||x1 ||...||xY −1 )
ac ← Enc(e, k)
a ← {{∀i, ahi }, ac }
Now an attacker has to retrieve all Y preimages to derive the ephemeral key
required to decrypt k.
Algorithm 7 k ← MultipleDifferent::AbradedKeyRetrieval(sk, a)
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, xi ← (Lookup(sk, ah∗ ))
e ← Hs (x0 ||x1 ||...||xY −1 )
k ← (Dec(e, ac ))
Modifying the scheme this way means that our tableless attacker has a much
harder time. There is a much smaller chance that they will get lucky and decrypt all
Y preimages. Specifically, to calculate their success, we sum uniform distributions.
Summing these distributions normalizes the tableless attacker’s chance of success and
ensures that at a small amount of work, they have little chance of success. The success
chance for various attackers in the “MutlipleDifferent” scheme is shown in Figure 6.3.
As can be seen, the success chance of the tableless attacker is starting to resemble
the graphs in Figure 5.2, used to illustrate Property G and Property H.
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The “MultipleDifferent” scheme has a different problem from the “MultipleSame”
scheme. The table attacker has a much harder time increasing their chance of success.
They must put large amounts of work into all the tables to ensure they can recover
many messages. They lose most of their work due to chain merges while building
these large TMTOs.

Figure 6.3: Tableless vs table attacker, MultipleDifferent construction. Y = 5, N =
225

6.3.2

Description

In this section, we present our main construction. In this construction, the attacker must retrieve a subset X of the Y preimages (xi ). We show that this gives
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us the desired properties of both of the two previous schemes, “MultipleSame” and
“MultipleDifferent.” Our main construction ensures that the tableless attacker does
not have a significant chance of decrypting a message until they’ve done a significant
amount of work. At the same time, this scheme allows our table attacker to retrieve
many messages without wasting too much work. The table attacker does not need
to compute unreasonably large TMTOs to achieve 1 −  success chance. We call this
scheme the “X-of-Y” abrasion scheme because it requires the attacker to reverse X
of Y hashes. In the following sections, we define the functions that make up our
construction. These functions follow the outline for an abrasion scheme described in
Section 5.3.
We review the variables used in this section in Table 6.1.
Assume SSGen(k, m, n) is a secret sharing generator and SSDecrypt(c, s0 ) retrieves
those secrets as described in Section 3.2.
Assume (c ← Enc(k, m)) is a strong ( 256 − bit) authenticated symmetric encryption with related decryption function (m ← Dec(k, c)). Because it is authenticated,
an authentication tag will be generated with with the ciphertext. The authentication
tag is used by the attacker to verify that they’ve retrieved the correct preimage. If
there were no way to make this verification, our attacker would not know when they
had broken the puzzle. We address the security of this authentication tag and the
ciphertext in Section 7.4.
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Table 6.1: Important variable definitions
Variable
I
Q
R
Y
X
N
λ
g
n

1−
Pr[S∗ ]
w
l, m, t
k
pk
b
sk
x
Hs
ah
e
s
sc
c

6.3.3

Meaning
Required cost in dollars to decrypt 1 message
Required work in hash invocations to decrypt 1 message
Work ratio, legitimate attacker over malicious attacker
Number of distinct hash functions/preimages
Required reversals/preimages (out of Y )
Search space of hash function
Security parameter that defines g, n and 
Number of abrasion tags given to malicious attacker (2λ )
Number of abrasion tags decryptable by legitimate adversary (2λ )
Success chance of malicious attacker (2−λ )
Success chance of legitimate attacker
Success chance
Work (in hash invocations)
TMTO parameters
Key to be abraded
Public key (bit string)
Bit length of strong key (b ≥ 256)
Private key (set of TMTOs)
Preimage
Strong hash function
Abrasion hash
Ephemeral key
Secret shares
Secret share ciphertext
Extra ciphertext of secret sharing

Abrasion scheme initialization

Algorithm 8 pk ← XofY::AbrasionSchemeInitialization(Q, λ, R)
$

pk ←
− {0, 1}b
X≈
N←

Y
2
Q∗R
Y
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The public key (pk) is generated in the same way the simple hash scheme generates
the public key in Section 6.1.1.
N is the size of each weakened hash function. Using the matrix stopping rule,
our attacker will spend N work on each of the Y hash functions. To ensure that our
scheme costs at least Q work to break at the given R, we must set N appropriately
so that N ∗ Y = Q ∗ R.
In order to achieve a small R a large Y must be used. X is set appropriately to
ensure the table attacker has 1 −  probability of success when building tables where
w = N . This leads to a value of X that is about half of Y . We calculate the success
chance of our table attacker for this construction in Section 6.3.10.

6.3.4

Abrasion tag generation

Algorithm 9 a ← XofY::AbradeKey(pk, k)
{s, c} = SSGen(k, X, Y )
$

− {0, 1, ..., N − 1}
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, xi ←
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, ahi ← Hs (pk + i||xi ) mod N
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, ei ← Hs (pk + 2 ∗ Y + i||Hs (pk + Y + i||xi ))
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, sci ← Enc(ei , si )
a ← {{∀i, ahi , sci }, c}

The key portions of Algorithm 9 are depicted in Figure 6.4 which shows how each
element in the abrasion tag is derived.
First, we run secret sharing to retrieve the secret shares s. Then we pick Y random
nonces from the search space. The abrasion hashes are then generated (ah∗ ). These
are meant to be attacked during decryption. Then we generate the ephemeral keys
(e∗ ) using different public keys for the hash function.
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Figure 6.4: Generation of each element in the abrasion tag in Algorithm 9
We compute the hash twice while generating the ephemeral keys to ensure that
they are not the target of an attack. If we simply used xi to encrypt each share,
an attacker could iterate through the input space and search for the given MAC to
decrypt si . We discuss this attack in Section 7.4.
The secret shares are then encrypted with the ephemeral keys. All ei and si are
discarded at this point. This leaves us with only the ciphertexts of the shares (sc∗ ).
The abrasion tag, ‘a,’ is now stored on disk to be presented upon warrant along
with records encrypted with k. The abraded key, ‘k,’ can be kept in secure memory
to do a number of abraded encryptions. This helps amortize the disk space and
computation usage by the client as well as cost-per-message for the table attacker.
This key should be scrubbed intermittently and the generation function should be run
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again to get a new key and tag. Using the same k for long periods of time increases the
damage done by data breaches as an attacker will be able to decrypt more messages
with a single k. This enhancement is considered only to increase the performance of
the client. In this thesis, we considered breaking a single tag to be synonymous with
decrypting a single message, ignoring the fact that messaging platforms could use k
to encrypt multiple messages.

6.3.5

Abrasion private key generation

Algorithm 10 sk ← XofY::AbrasionPrivateKeyGeneration(pk)
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, ski = BuildTMTO(Hs (pk + i||·) mod N )

The legitimate attacker now computes Y TMTOs, one for each of the distinct
hash functions. The function “BuildTMTO” is described in Section 6.1.3.
Their work is split evenly among the different TMTOs. This maximizes the effectiveness of their work. To achieve ≈ 100% success, they will need to compute each
hash function

Q∗R
Y

= N times. This amount of work follows the “matrix stopping

rule” described in Section 6.2.

6.3.6

Abraded key retrieval

Algorithm 11 k ← XofY::AbradedKeyRetrieval(sk, a = {{ah, sc}, c})
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, xi ← Lookup(ski , ahi )
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, ei ← Hs (pk + 2 ∗ Y + i||Hs (pk + Y + i||xi ))
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., Y − 1}, si ← Dec(ei , sci )
k = SSDecrypt(c, s0 ), s0 ⊂ s, |s0 | = X
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Figure 6.5: Retrieval of each share in an abrasion tag in Algorithm 11
We illustrate the key parts of Algorithm 11 in Figure 6.5. This diagram complements Figure 6.4 to show both encryption and decryption in our abrasion construction.
After computing each of the TMTOs, a table attacker will lookup each of the
abrasion hashes (ahi ) in their tables. They can stop once they’ve retrieved X preimages (xi ). The attacker then regenerates the ephemeral keys (ei ) and uses them to
decrypt the shares (si ). Using the X shares they’ve decrypted, the attacker can retrieve the abraded key k from the secret sharing scheme using SSDecrypt. Because
we only require that |s0 | ≥ X, many of the lookups in the TMTOs can fail without
preventing the table attacker from decrypting the abrasion puzzle.
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6.3.7

Cost calculations

A table attacker performs Q ∗ R hash function invocations. This work is evenly
split among the Y distinct hash functions, creating a different TMTO for each of the
hash functions.
Using Hellman’s TMTO, the storage for each TMTO (M ) will be m ∗ l rows as
each TMTO contains l tables of m rows. The total storage will be Y ∗ m ∗ l rows.
Because our table attacker splits their work evenly among the TMTOs, m∗l∗t =

Q∗R
,
Y

where m, l, and t parameterize each of the TMTO. Because we use the standard trade
off, m = l = t =(
Q∗R
Y

Y∗



2
3

Q∗R 13
) .
Y

This makes the total number of rows, Y ∗ m ∗ l, equal to

.

For each row, we need to store the starting point and the end point. We can
represent all m starting points for each table in log2 (m) bits and each ending point of
the weakened hash as log2 (N ) bits. Although there are more possible starting points
(up to N ), we only need log2 (m) bits to store all possible values for a single TMTO
table. To vary starting points between tables, the index of the table is appended to
the starting point when computing chains. This method was shown by Barkan et al.
[25].
In the online phase, our table attacker will search at most Y TMTOs to retrieve
the X preimages. Searching a single TMTO requires T = ttable ∗ l = t ∗ 1.5 ∗ l
invocations of the hash function. This means our online cost to reverse an abrasion
tag (Ttag ) is Ttag ≤ T ∗ Y = t ∗ 1.5 ∗ l ∗ Y . The 1.5 in this calculation accounts for
false alarms as described in section 3.1.
To create an abrasion tag, the client will have to invoke the hash function multiple
times. Each weakened hash result requires an invocation of the hash function and
each ephemeral key requires two invocations of the hash function. Because there are
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Y hash results and Y ephemeral keys, this means the client will compute the hash
function Y ∗ 3 times for each abrasion tag.
In Section 6.3.8 we explain how we can redefine the hash function (Hs ) to modify
these costs.

6.3.8

Decisions, details and alternatives

We can modify Hs (·) independent of the rest of the scheme. Equation 6.1 represents defining Hs as computing DoubleSHA256 u-times. Increasing u increases the
cost of our attackers (Q) without increasing the space required to store the private
key.

Hs (·) = (DoubleSHA256)u (·)

(6.1)

Running DoubleSHA256 multiple times will also increase the cost of the client
and online cost of the table attacker. To keep our scheme practical, we only increase
u to 500. Each of these invocations of DoubleSHA256 is performed using a distinct
public key (derived from pk) to prevent stored preimages from helping a malicious
adversary. We describe how even a malicious attacker could store computations to
break a single tag faster if we used indistinct hash functions in Section 7.2. To make
our construction secure, we use large numbers of shares that are not supported by
the popular secret sharing libraries [11, 12]. The best performance analysis of secret
sharing schemes currently states that generating a number of shares around Y ≈ 40
takes about .22 seconds [21]. We speculate that an implementation that scales to meet
our needs would not be difficult to create and would still be performant. If future
work finds that secret sharing is not practical at this scale, an alternative scheme
could be used. We describe this alternative in Section 6.3.9.
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6.3.9

Probabilistic sharing

Secret sharing schemes are designed to break up keys to split among different parties. We discuss secret sharing in Section 3.2. These schemes require hard guarantees
on the number of keys required to decrypt the secret. With probabilistic sharing, we
forego these properties to relax the computational intensity.
The idea of this scheme is to statistically require X shares out of Y . The scheme
assumes that shares are found through blind guessing. Any attacker must blindly
guess preimages in the random oracle model, so this assumption should hold for our
abrasion scheme.
With regards to our hash abrasion scheme, probabilistic sharing replaces SSGen
and SSDecrypt with PSGen (Probabilistic Share Generation) and PSDecrypt (Probabilistic Share Decryption) respectively.
PSGen creates a ciphertext c, along a pool of Y shares (|s| = Y ) similar to SSGen.
Some number of shares (Y −d) are duplicates of other shares. There are only d distinct
shares.
{s, c} = PSGen(k, X, Y ), X ≤ Y
PSDecrypt is a function to retrieve k.

k = PSDecrypt(c, s0 )

.
The set, s0 , contains only the distinct shares of s. This means the size of s0 (|s0 |)
is d. The value of d is set so that while reversing preimages blindly, the expected
number of reversals is X. d will generally be less than X (d ≤ X).
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An ephemeral key (e) is generated during PSGen.

e = Hs (s00 ||s01 ||...||s0d−1 )

This ephemeral key is used to encrypt the secret k using a randomized encryption
and the ciphertext (e) is returned along with the pool of shares (s).

c ← Enc(e, k)

We do not analyze how using this would affect our security. We propose probabilistic sharing as an option to be considered if traditional secret sharing becomes too
costly.

6.3.10

Main construction success chance

We describe TMTOs in Section 3.1 and derive an approximation of a lower bound
on the success chance of multiple Hellman tables in Appendix A.
A binomial distribution can be used to model the probability of exactly X successes out of Y trials given probability p. Our table attacker splits their work evenly
among Y different TMTOs, each giving the same probability of success (Pr[STMTO ]).
Because we only require X out of Y hashes to be reversed successfully, our table
attackers success chance to reverse a single abrasion tag (Pr[Stag ]) can be calculated
with the binomial distribution as shown in Equation 6.2. Where Binomial(k, n, p) =
 k
n
· p (1 − p)n−k = Pr[k successes out of n trials, each with p chance of success]
k

Pr[Stag ] =

i≤Y
X

Binomial(i, Y, Pr[STMTO ])

i=X
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(6.2)

Because our legitimate attacker wants to recover n messages, we multiply our
success n times, shown in Equation 6.3.

Pr[Slegitimate ] =

n
Y

Pr[Stag ]

i=0

Pr[Slegitimate ] =

i≤Y
X

!n
Binomial(i, Y, Pr[STMTO ])

(6.3)

i=X

By using a lower bound for Pr[STMTO ], we can calculate a lower bound for Pr[Slegitimate ]
using Equation 6.3. When computing the work of our legitimate attacker (wlegitimate ),
we evaluate what value of w causes Equation 6.3 to equal 1 −  where  is very close
to zero. This calculation is used in Section 8 to evaluate the security of our scheme.
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Chapter 7
Security

In this chapter, we define our legitimate attacker in Section 7.1. A security game
with an oracle is presented in Section 7.2. This game and oracle are specifically
created for our main construction, described in 6.3.2. This security game is not
indended to be used to evaluate other constructions. We then show how to calculate
the success chance of an adversary in this security game in Section 7.3. The security
game and oracle allow us to find values (λ, R) for Definition 2 from Section 5.2. We
also mention other attacks in Section 7.4 and explain how our construction is security
against them.

7.1

Legitimate attacker definition
Our legitimate attacker creates a private key that can be used to decrypt n abraded

keys with 1 −  probability, where n is a security parameter from Definition 1. We
calculate the success of this attacker in Section 6.3.10. We define “work” in our
construction as computations of the hash function Hs (·). This legitimate attacker
does not actually have to decrypt each message, but only create a private key that
has the potential to decrypt n messages. Leaving the cost of each decryption out
of this definition is realistic as our per-message cost will be offset when we combine
this scheme with a crumpling scheme. We set 2λ to be much larger than the number
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of messages that law enforcement will decrypt. This large chance of success ensures
that law enforcement will never be unable to decrypt an important record with their
computed private key.

7.2

Security game and oracle description
To calculate the security ratio in Definition 2, we will need to bound the success

chance of any adversary. Any attack will involve searching the input space of hash
functions to find preimages. An attacker can switch their focus among different hash
functions during this search. While attacking a set of abrasion tags, there are many
preimages to find in each hash function. This gives the adversary many choices to
make. For example, one strategy is switch to searching untried hash functions after
finding a single preimage. Another strategy could be to reverse many preimages from
a single hash function and then move on to get a better chance of finding matching preimages. While continuing to find preimages, the attacker could have many
combinations of matching preimages, each suggesting a different optimal decision on
which hash function to search next. Instead of calculating the optimal decision at any
point, we create a security game and give an adversary access to a powerful oracle.
This game and oracle are crafted in a way that makes it easy to calculate the success
chance of the optimal strategy and ensures that this bounds any adversary without
the oracle.
While describing this game and oracle, we will represent any set of the form:
{0, 1, ..., x − 1} as Zx .
We assume that hash functions are random oracles in this security proof. This is
described in Section 6.1 and is commonly used in security proofs [26]. This allows us
to predict exactly how much work is required to reverse a hash.
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In this security game, the adversary can only query the oracle once.
First the adversary is given g different abrasion tags. Viewing these tags, the
adversary selects a permutation of the input space for each hash function. This is
the order in which the adversary will pick preimages to compute and compare with
the abrasion hashes, ah. The adversary can choose different orderings for each hash
function and must choose these orderings before querying the oracle. The adversary
must use these orderings to search the hash functions after querying the oracle. Fixing
these orderings is a reasonable restriction as there is no information (without this
security oracle) that would suggest a better search order. There is no information to
be gained because we treat these hash functions as truly random functions
The adversary submits 2 values to the oracle: the order of preimages which they
will search for in each hash function: fj , j ∈ ZY , and the g abrasion tags they have:
ai , i ∈ Zg .
These search orderings (permutations of ZN ) that the adversary gives to the oracle
are represented by Y bijective functions fj , j ∈ ZY , fj (y) 6= fj (z), y 6= z. Each order
function has the same input and output space of ZN (fj : ZN → ZN ).
The adversary can generate all permutations (fj , j ∈ ZY ) at no cost. All communication between the adversary and the oracle is considered to be free when calculating
the adversary’s work.
The oracle picks out an abrasion tag (am ) and indicates X hash functions, represented as the set, HX . The tag, am , is the easiest to break of the g supplied abrasion
tags and HX defines the easiest hash functions to search to find preimages for that
tag. Choosing am and HX is dependent on the given the permutations of ZN , f∗ .
The oracle returns this information ({am , HX }) to the adversary.
The adversary now searches through the X given hash functions (HX ) and finds
preimages for the abrasion tag that the oracle revealed to them (am ). The adversary
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tries potential preimages in their pre-defined orderings, f∗ , until they have recovered
X correct preimages. Recovering X correct preimages completes the solution of the
abrasion puzzle as the adversary can now use secret sharing to recover k.
Because this adversary is given the optimal hash functions to attack (HX ), their
strategy is optimal for their order chosen. There is no better way to choose an order
to search preimages because we assume they are truly random functions. We can
now see that there’s no practical adversary (without this oracle) that could retrieve
a message faster than an adversary with this oracle. This means that bounding the
success chance of this adversary with the oracle will bound any adversary without
the oracle.
After the best HX is revealed, the adversary cannot store work to gain success
faster. They gain nothing because saved computations would only help reverse preimages in the same hash function. They only need to reverse a single preimage for each
hash function and saved computations will not help them break the other preimages
which are hashed with different hash functions. An example of this is where xi = xi+1 .
If the hash functions were not distinct, a malicious attacker would know that these
two preimages were the same by comparing the abrasion hash of each. The attacker
could then refer to their previous computations to reverse xi+1 after reversing xi .

7.3

Success calculations
In this section we will show how to calculate the probability of success of a mali-

cious adversary with this oracle, Pr[Smalicious ], for a given amount of work wmalicious .
The work spent by this adversary is now the minimum value of the set of the
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minimum work required for each of the submitted messages, (min(wi )).

wmalicious = min({min(w0 ), min(w1 ), ..., min(wg−1 )})

The work to break each hash function in a single abrasion tag can be found by
looking at the search order fj submitted by the adversary for each hash function hj .
We define xi,j and wi,j as the preimage and the work required for the j-th distinct
hash function of the i-th abrasion tag in g. We know the work required to recover
one of these preimages will be the order of xi,j in the adversary’s preimage search.
This means work for each hash is now: wi,j = fj (xi,j ), j ∈ ZY . Because the attacker
only needs to reverse X preimages, the work to reverse a specific abrasion tag is now
min(wi ) = minX (f0 (xi,0 ), f1 (xi,1 ), ..., fY −1 (xi,Y −1 )). Where minX (∗) is the sum of
the X smallest values in a given set. We can now express wmalicious in terms of xi,j in
Equation 7.1.

wmalicious = min({∀i ∈ Zg , min(wi )})
wmalicious = min({minX (f∗ (x0,∗ )), minX (f∗ (x1,∗ )), ..., minX (f∗ (xg−1,∗ ))})
wmalicious = min({minX (f0 (x0,0 ), f1 (x0,1 ), ..., fY −1 (x0,Y −1 )),
minX (f0 (x1,0 ), f1 (x1,1 ), ..., fY −1 (x1,Y −1 )),
...,
minX (f0 (xg−1,0 ), f1 (xg−1,1 ), ..., fY −1 (xg−1,Y −1 ))})

(7.1)

When each abrasion tag is generated, we pick the preimages xi,j from a scaled
uniform distribution. This means that fj (xi,j ) is also a random variable from a scaled
uniform distribution.
wi,j ∼ N ∗ U nif orm(0, 1)
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We sum the work for the lowest X preimages, which means that the work follows
a sum of the lowest scaled uniform distributions.

min(wi ) = minX (wi,∗ ) =

X
X

wi,(k) ∼ N ∗ U nif orm(0, 1)

(7.2)

k=1

Where wi,(k) is an order statistic of the k-th lowest work required of the preimages
in the i-th abrasion puzzle.
To calculate this, we sample this sum of order statistics many times and fit a
normal curve to a histogram of the samples. The normal approximation is shown
in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The code used for the approximation is shown in Listing
7.1. We also calculate the error of this approximation, which is 5%. This error was
calculated by summing the absolute error between the normal pdf and a histogram
of the samples. We used 100 bins from the minimum to the maximum sample for the
histogram. This approximation also take into account attacks described in Section
7.4.
Listing 7.1 shows an excerpt from the python script used to find the construction
ratio. In this excerpt, we fit a normal distribution to the sum of minimum uniform
distributions.
Listing 7.1: Fit normal to order statistics
min_x_samples = [sum(sorted(scipy.uniform.rvs(loc=0,scale=N,size=Y))[:
,→ X]) for _ in range(0,20000)]
mean,stdev = scipy.norm.fit(min_x_samples)
The probability that the work of our adversary is less than any given work, w,
(wmalicious < w) is equal to the probability that there exists an abrasion tag in g that
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Figure 7.1: Uniform minimum sum pdf (approximated with 20,000 samples) vs normal
approximation
is easier to break:

Pr[wmalicious ≤ w] = Pr[∃i ∈ Zg , min(wi ) ≤ w]

The probability that such an i exists is the inverse of every min(wi ) being greater
than w:
Pr[∃i ∈ Zg , min(wi ) ≤ w] = 1 − Pr[∀i ∈ Zg , min(wi ) > w]
The probability of every min(wi ) being greater than w is the product of the
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Figure 7.2: Uniform minimum sum cdf (approximated with 20,000 samples) vs normal
approximation
probability that each message is greater.

Pr[∀i ∈ Zg , min(wi ) > w] = Pr[min(wi ) > w]g

We invert this so that we can use a cumulative density function to calculate it.

Pr[∀i ∈ Zg , min(wi ) > w] = (1 − Pr[min(wi ) ≤ w])g

Pr[wmalicious ≤ w] = Pr[∃i ∈ Zg , min(wi ) ≤ w] = 1 − Pr[∀i ∈ Zg , min(wi ) > w]
Pr[wmalicious ≤ w] = 1 − (1 − Pr[min(wi ) ≤ w])g
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Because we found that min(wi ) can be approximated by a normal distribution,
we can use the cumulative density function of the normal distribution to compute
Pr[min(wi ) ≤ w] and with that, easily compute Pr[wmalicious ≤ w].
The probability of success of this adversary (Pr[Smalicious ]), at a given work (w),
is the probability that the required work wmalicious is less than that work.

Pr[Smalicious ] at work w = Pr[wmalicious ≤ w]

We can now calculate the work when Pr[Smalicious ] = . This value gives of a lower
bound on the work of any malicious adversary as shown in Section 7.2.
In hash-based abrasion using TMTOs, we define our legitimate attacker as an
attacker that precomputes a TMTO to decrypt abrasion tags. We call this a “table
attacker.” The calculations for the probability of success for the table attacker are
derived in Section 6.3.10. We now know how to calculate the values needed to compute
our security as defined in Section 5.2.2, wlegitimate and wmalicious .
We calculate the work for our table attacker where our probability of success is
1 − . This allows us to derive a ratio, R.
wlegitimate
wmalicious
Work at Pr[Stable attacker recovers n ] = 1 − 
R=
Work at Pr[Stableless attacker recovers 1 given g ] = 
R=

(7.3)

We also factor in the cost of storage into this ratio in Section 8.2.
Different values of Y and X will yield different results. In Section 8 we give
concrete values. These optimal parameters yield a ratio of R ≤ 13.2 when λ = 45.
This means our scheme is 45-13.2-secure by Definition 2. We believe this is a sufficient
ratio to claim that this scheme accomplishes abrasion Property G and Property H.
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7.4

Other attacks
A malicious attacker could also attack other parts of the scheme, such as secret

sharing.
As described in Section 6.3.4, each share is encrypted with a strong key that
results from a weak hash. The result of this encryption is a ciphertext sci and an
authentication tag (ti ). This authentication tag was not shown in Algorithm 9 but
was assumed to be generated along with each sci . Generally, the authentication tag
is computed on the ciphertext of an encryption. This encryption mode is known
as “Encrypt-then-MAC” [39]. Using “Encrypt-then-MAC” means that an attacker
could recompute the exact same authentication tag on the ciphertext if they find the
correct key.
To perform a brute-force search, a malicious attacker only needs a conditional to
test if they’ve found the correct preimage. For each preimage, the adversary can use
a brute-force attack on either the intended hash functions, ahi , or the authentication
tag for that share, ti . The two conditionals necessary to perform these brute-force
searches are shown in Equations 7.4 and 7.5. All of these variables except for xi
are given to the adversary, allowing them to brute-force search for xi using either
conditional.
?

(7.4)

?

(7.5)

Hs (pk + i||xi ) = ahi
MAC(Hs (pk + 2 ∗ Y + i||Hs (pk + Y + i||xi )), sci ) = ti

This second conditional allows for a potentially easier path to recover preimages
as the attacker’s search order for ti could yield xi faster. This means that the easiest
way to find a preimage is the smallest of a pair of uniform variables. These two
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uniform variables are the order in which the adversary would recover the preimage
through either the abrasion hash ahi or the authentication tag ti . Using this fact, we
can show an updated calculation for min(wi ) in g in Equation 7.6. We previously
derived min(wi ) in Equation 7.2. The function f 0 (·) is the ordering the adversary
picks for the distinct hash functions used to create the ephemeral keys. We multiply
this second value in the pair by 2 because two invocations of the hash function Hs (·)
are used to create the ephemeral key during the brute-force attacks which doubles
the work required. We can approximate this with a normal distribution as shown in
Figures 7.1 and 7.2.

min(wi ) = minX (min(f0 (xi,0 ), 2f00 (xi,0 )),
min(f0 (xi,1 ), 2f10 (xi,1 )),
...,
min(f0 (xi,Y −1 ), 2f10 (xi,Y −1 )))
min(wi ) = minX (∀j ∈ ZY , min(fj (xi,j ), 2fj0 (xi,j )))

(7.6)

Even if we removed this authentication tag from our scheme, secret sharing could
also give a malicious attacker other ways to brute-force preimages. If the attacker
has recovered X − 1 correct shares (|s∗ | = X − 1), they can brute-force search the
last share they need regardless of the secret sharing scheme used. The conditional
needed for this brute-force search is shown in Equation 7.7. In this brute-force search,
attacker can choose a plaintext (p) and retrieve the ciphertext and abrasion tag c, a.
This p could be a message sent over the messaging platform that is performing the
abraded encryption. This c is different than the c described in our construction in
Section 6.3 and is instead the result of the encryption of p with key k. Allowing

66

an attacker this ability is a reasonable attack scenario known as a chosen plaintext
attack. After the attacker finds an xi that satisfies this condition, they can recover
the last share and learn k.

e0 = Hs (pk + 2 ∗ Y + i||Hs (pk + Y + i||xi ))
s0 = Dec(e0 , sc)
k 0 = SSDecrypt(s∗ + {s0 })
?

Dec(k 0 , c) = p

(7.7)

Bounding all attacks using the secret sharing scheme is difficult and relies on properties of the secret sharing scheme. To make our abrasion construction independent
of which secret sharing scheme is being used, we assume that an attacker can always
brute-force search for ephemeral keys to break the scheme.
To ensure this attack does not affect our security significantly, we require computation of the hash function Hs twice when deriving keys from each nonce, xi . This
double hash makes it much more costly to retrieve a secret share using the authentication tag compared to reversing an abrasion hash (ah∗ ) as intended. The table
attacker only has to compute this double invocation of Hs this when verifying a
preimage, meaning it doesn’t affect their online cost significantly.
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Chapter 8
Results

In this chapter, we use real-world parameters to calculate the security and cost
of our scheme. First, we will show the parmeters used, the security ratio (R), and
important costs in Section 8.1. Then we show calculations of other costs associated
with a scheme intialized with these parameters in Section 8.2. We show costs for
other sets of parameters in Table 8.1.

8.1

Summary
For reference, we provided a number of definitions of important variables in Table

6.1 in Section 6.3.2.
Established in Section 5.2, we want to calculate the ratio of the work done by our
legitimate attacker vs the work done by a malicious attacker

R=

wlegitimate 
.
wmalicious

Using calculations in Chapter 7, we can now calculate bounds on wmalicious . Shown
in Section 6.3.10, we can calculate the cost of our table attacker (wlegitimate ). In Section
6.3.7 we show how to calculate other associated costs with the construction.
We set concrete parameters: Y = 6114, X = 3035, g = 245 (trillions of records),
 = 2−45 , n = 245 , N = 263 , and define Hs (·) as 500 computations of DoubleSHA256.
With these parameters, we find that our table attacker spends $40.2 million computing the hash function and our security ratio (R) is ≤ 13.2. This means that if
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our legitimate adversary spends $40.2 million on a private key that can decrypt 245
records, an adversary that decrypts a single message will spend $3 million.
The required work for a table attacker is low enough to allow law enforcement to
investigate. At the same time, the cost of a tableless attacker ($3 million) is high
enough to deter smaller attackers from decrypting records. The resources of these
attackers were estimated in Section 5.1.4. Our main construction is the first abrasion
scheme that provably provides these properties. Allowing decryption by a table attacker while preventing attacks by malicious attackers means that our construction
achieves Property G and Property H.
These parameters were found through experimentation. We follow the “matrix
stopping rule” described in Section 6.2 and fix Y, N, Hs (·) to give us a $40.2 million
cost, then found the X that gives our table attacker 1− success chance. The security
ratio, R, was then computed using these parameters.
Larger values of Y and X give better ratios, but also impose a larger cost for
computing abrasion tags and increase storage requirements. The best ratio of

X
Y

stayed around 50% regardless of the values of Y or N . Using our approximations, we
were able to compute this ratio up to Q = 280 which is an abraded encryption that
could reasonably cost billions of dollars to break. At any reasonable value of I (from
$1 million to $100 million), our scheme stays secure with acceptable security ratios.
We only compare invocations of the hash function when calculating the security
ratio. Factoring in storage requires us to factor in hash efficiency and power costs
which makes analyzing schemes much more complicated.
A comparison of table and tableless success chances is shown in Figure 8.1, which
starts at 0 work and continues to the work required where Pr[Slegitimate ] = 1 − . The
“s-curve” parts of these two attackers’ probabilities are shown in Figures 8.2 and 8.3.
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Figure 8.1: Tableless vs table attacker, success chance vs work
8.2

Detailed cost analysis
Calculations showed that the table adversary would need to perform Q ∗ R =

N ∗ Y ≈ 5.64 ∗ 1022 computations of the hash function Hs .
We used calculations from the original paper on crumpled and abraded security
[58], to estimate the cost of electricity that a table attacker will use to derive a private
key for this abrasion puzzle. The calculation of our legitimate attacker’s cost to create
a private key is shown in Equation 8.1.
5.64 ∗ 1022 ∗ 500 Hashes
1 kW h
$
∗
∗ .0523
≈ $40.2 million (8.1)
10
1.02 ∗ 10 Hashes/Joule 3, 600, 000 Joules
kW h
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Figure 8.2: Tableless attacker  to 1 −  success chance
This assumes that the government purchases very powerful hashing equipment,
the Antminer S9, which has an efficiency of 1.02 ∗ 1010 Hashes/Joule [17, 58]. The
cost of purchasing this hardware is not calculated. When calculating the ratio, we
assume a tableless attacker purchases the same hardware as the table attacker.
We find M ∗ Y and multiply it by the storage requirement for each row to get the
total storage cost, shown in Equation 8.2.

(m ∗ l) ∗ Y ∗ (start point bytes + end point bytes) = bytes of storage

2
  

5.64 ∗ 1022 3
63
log2 (m)
∗ 6144 ∗
+
≈ 296 PB
6144
8
8
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(8.2)

Figure 8.3: Table attacker  to 1 −  success chance
The cost to store these TMTOs would vary. Using projected hard disk drive costs
for 2019 [6], we calculate the cost of storing a private key in Equation 8.3.

296 PB ∗ 1, 000, 000

GB
$
∗ 0.03
= $8.8 million
PB
GB

(8.3)

This storage cost does not overwhelm our electrical cost. This pool of storage
can be split up into Y = 6114 different searchable arrays, each containing 47 TB.
Splitting the data up this way should substantially reduce the overhead cost to store
this data, which is left out of our calculations.
Now we can derive the total precomputation cost of our table attacker, described
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in Equation 8.4.

electrical cost + storage cost = total cost
$40.2 million + $8.8 million = $49 million

(8.4)

Including the storage cost gives us a cost ratio of 16. We keep this total cost ratio
distinct from our security ratio (R) as the cost ratio will fluctuate based on hardware
efficiency and electricity costs. The security ratio, R, is based on invocations of the
hash function and will never change due to changes in hardware/electricity cost.
The online cost for each decryption with a table will be the equivalent of searching
2

through T ∗ 6114 = t ∗ l ∗ 1.5 ∗ 6114 hashes, coming to around N 3 ∗ 1.5 ∗ 6114 = 4 ∗ 1016
operations. Using the cost analysis from the original paper [58], we calculate the
online cost of the table attacker in Equation 8.5.
4 ∗ 1016 ∗ 500 Hashes
1 kW h
$
∗
∗ .0523
≈ $29
10
1.02 ∗ 10 Hashes/Joule 3, 600, 000 Joules
kW h

(8.5)

This cost is smaller than the crumpling cost suggested [58], which was ≈ $1000. If
we combine this scheme with a crumpling scheme, we can adjust the cost of retrieving
a crumple-encrypted message to offset the $29 imposed per-message by this abrasion
scheme. This low per-message cost gives our scheme Property F.
The client needs to compute Y hashes of 500 length 3 times. We calculate the
cost of computing an abrasion tag in Equation 8.6.
6114 ∗ 3 ∗ 500 Hashes
1 kW h
$
∗
∗ .0523
≈ $0.0000003
5
5 ∗ 10 Hashes/Joule 3, 600, 000 Joules
kW h

(8.6)

The client must compute Hs for each distinct hash function to compute the abra-
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sion hashes ahi . This multiplication by 3 comes from the two extra Hs invocations
needed to generate the keys to encrypt the secret shares. The reasoning for this
double hashing is described in Section 7.4.
We use a weaker Hashes/Joule ratio, associated with CPUs, to calculate client
cost as clients will not likely use powerful hashing hardware like Antminers. A value
of 5 ∗ 105 Hashes/Joule was used in [58].
The frequency of abrasion tag computations can be adjusted as described in Section 6.3.2 to offset this cost and the storage size of abrasion tags. This storage size is
computed in Equation 8.7.

Y ∗



1 byte
+ 32
log2 (N ) ∗
8 bits

6114 ∗ (d63/8e + 32) = 244.5 KB

(8.7)

The extra 32 bytes accounts for the secret share ciphertexts. Each of these takes
32 bytes including a MAC.
There are many trade-offs to consider in these calculations. Depending on how
important some factors are, these parameters could be adjusted to achieve different
costs. One major trade-off is the number of hashes that Hs (·) computes. Increasing
this will decrease the storage required by the table attacker, but also increase the cost
of computing an abrasion tag.
These parameters must be fixed for all clients. Changing Y , X, N or H(·) will
force the table attacker to regenerate some or all of their table to maintain the same
chance of success.
A legitimate attacker could also adjust l, m, and t to change the storage/online
costs of their TMTO solution. They could also use another TMTO such as rainbow
tables or distinguished points. We do not explore this in this work.
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If this strategy were adopted by a legal system, law enforcement could build this
TMTO strategy on-the-fly, meaning they spend somewhere between $3 million and
$49 million to decrypt their first message while still building the TMTO tables. Their
total cost will increase as they decrypt more and more abrasion tags, getting to $49
million after they decrypt trillions of records.
In Table 8.1, we calculate the ratios and costs of schemes with other parameters.
All rows use a λ of 2−45 . The parameter u defines the number of invocations of
DoubleSHA256 used by Hs . The cost for the table attacker includes storage in this
table. The first row displays the values found previously in this section. Row 2 shows
what happens when all parameters are scaled up. Rows 3 and 4 show what happens
when we redefine Hs . Rows 5 through 7 show what happens when we change the input
space for preimages. Rows 8 through 11 show what happens when we modify both
Y and X. In rows 12 and 13, we’ve reduced the work spent on each hash function
(wlegitimate = N 2∗Y ) and the ideal X was reduced to give this table attacker 1 − 
chance of success. Deviations from the first row are highlighted for set parameters
(R is derived from other parameters).

8.3

Revisiting abrasion requirements
In this section, we list the properties that our main construction, from Section 6.3,

achieves. We reference the locations in the thesis where we proved these properties.
Many of our claims rely on the fact that reversing the hash functions is the easiest
way to break the scheme. This is proven in Section 7.4.
During the description in Section 6.3.2 we described how our construction uses a
public key to satisfy Property C.
Because the weakest part of our encryption uses hash functions, we can easily
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Table 8.1: Costs with other parameters
Parameters
Costs (millions of dollars)
# N Y
X
u
R
Table Malicious Storage
63
1 2
6114
3035 500
13.2 $49.0
$3
$8.8
64
2 2
7000
3499 700
12.8 $144.9 $10.1
$16.1
63
3 2
6114
3035 100
13.2 $16.9
$0.6
$8.8
4 263 6114 3035 1000 13.2 $80.3 $6
$8.8
64
5 2
6114
3035 500
13.2 $80.3
$6
$14
60
6 2
6114
3035 500
13.2 $7.2
$0.4
$2.2
67
7 2
6114
3035 500
13.2 $704.0 $49.5
$61.5
8 263 8000 4024 500 12.5 $52.5 $4.2
$11.6
63
9 2
10000 5079 500
12.1 $80.2
$5.4
$14.5
63
10 2
4000
1936 500
14.5 $32.1
$1.8
$5.8
11 263 1000 419 500 25.9 $8.0
$0.3
$1.5
63
12 2
6114
1885 500
18.8 $25.7
$1.1
$5.6
63
13 2
10000 3035 500
17.1 $39.6
$1.8
$8.8

Costs (dollars)
Online
$29
$73.1
$5.7
$57
$45
$7.2
$182.4
$37.5
$47.0
$18.8
$4.7
$18.1
$28.4

calculate the costs of how to break it. This is similar to how the costs for crumpling
were originally calculated [58]. This gives our construction Property E.
When treating hash functions as a random oracle model, there is no way to reverse a hash without iterating through its input space [26]. This allows any abrasion
construction that is based on hash functions to achieve Property I as there’s no way
to generate a public key that makes the hashes easier to reverse. Random oracles are
described in Section 7.2.
From our first simple hash-based abrasion scheme in Section 6.1 it should be clear
how an adversary can reuse a TMTO as a “private key,” satisfying Property D.
We described a security model in Section 5.2, created a security game and oracle for
our scheme in Chapter 7, and calculated real world numbers in Chapter 8. Our main
construction is the first abrasion scheme to provably guarantee security. We describe
the resources of various attackers in Section 5.1.4 and thus can claim Property G and
Property H. Also in Chapter 8, we show that our private key is very large, which
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could help prevent its theft. This could be beneficial and meets Property K.
In Section 8.2, we calculated other costs of our scheme, proving that it is practical.
We also calculated the per-message cost of our abrasion construction. This cost is
much smaller than the crumpling cost suggested by Wright and Varia [58]. This means
that, when our scheme is combined with a crumpling scheme, it achieves Property F.
As for ease of implementation, we integrated crumpled logging into Postfix in
Section 4. This implementation is quite simple, and an abraded encryption implementation may not be much more complicated. Our construction also does not require
any secret keys to be escrowed. These two qualities show that our construction would
be simple to implement, as required by Property J.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion

In this thesis we were able to achieve a practical abraded encryption scheme and
evaluate the cost and security of it. We developed a framework to evaluate the security
of any abrasion scheme. The main construction presented in this thesis is the first
abrasion construction to be proven to guarantee any level of security. While some
of the costs for storage and computation of our construction may seem undesirable,
they are not overwhelming. We also created a proof of concept for crumpling.

9.1

Future work
We believe that probabilistic sharing (described in Section 6.3.9) can be used to

reduce the cryptographic dependencies of this construction, thus making it easier to
implement and audit. Future work will evaluate the security of our construction when
used with probabilistic sharing.
Another improvement to the abrasion construction would be to modify the abrasion function described in Section 6.3.4 to mimic the creation of a TMTO. Introducing
similarities between tag creation and table creation ensures that tables are more effective in reversing tags when compared to brute-force attacks. Specifically, we believe
that if each abrasion hash were computed in a chain in the same way that TMTO
chains were computed, our table attacker would have a significant advantage. This
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improvement should reduce our ratio dramatically, but requires a new security oracle
and game to fully analyze. Also, more research into TMTOs would be required to
derive the legitimate attacker’s success chance.
This abrasion construction could have applications in other fields. The novel
properties of one-time work for multiple decryption could possibly be used in a proofof-work blockchain or similar technology.

9.2

Crumpling and abrasion
The monetary cost of abrasion and crumpling is not negligible even with ideal

constructions as we must force attackers to spend work to deter small attackers and
rate limit law enforcement. Combining this solution with other exceptional access
solutions such as AUDIT [36] or self-escrow [54] could help reduce this cost. The cost
of doing nothing is arguably greater than any of these exceptional access solutions
as uncontrolled weakening of security by law enforcement could have far more costly
effects on society.
One potential problem with abrasion is the possible creation of criminal tag reversal as a service. A larger criminal could spend the initial cost to break the abrasion
puzzle, then sell individual decryptions to smaller criminals to recoup their loss. While
this would be a problem, abrasion would naturally centralize criminals that had the
ability to do these decryptions. A centralized criminal organization is easier to attack
than many smaller operations.

9.3

Safety and privacy
Our criminal investigations are progressively requiring more interaction with tech-

nology and the internet. With internet privacy being so important today, compromise
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between privacy and safety is hard to develop and solutions to this problem can be
very polarizing, politically. Attempting to introduce a compromise is often met with
fierce opposition, which hampers progress towards a solution. Part of the motivation
for this construction is to generate conversation about this compromise. We hope
that this construction can be used to create or inspire the creation of more, practical,
compromises between privacy and security in the future.

80

References

[1] “Cryptolocker victims to get files back for free,” British Broadcasting
Company,

Aug. 2014. [Online]. Available:

https://www.bbc.com/news/

technology-28661463
[2] “Deep dive into crypto ‘exceptional access’ mandates:

Effective or

constitutional-pick one,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, Aug. 2015. [Online].

Available:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/08/deep-dive-crypto-

exceptional-access-mandates-effective-or-constitutional-pick-one
[3] “Fbi director says agents need access to encrypted data to preserve
public

safety,”

National

Public

Radio,

Jul.

2015.

[Online].

Avail-

able:

https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/08/421251662/fbi-

director-says-agents-need-access-to-encrypted-data-to-preserve-public-safety
[4] “Carpenter v. united states,” U.S. Supreme Court, Jun 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-402 h315.pdf
[5] “Police use fitbit data to charge 90-year-old man in stepdaughter’s killing,”
New York Times, Oct. 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/10/03/us/fitbit-murder-arrest.html

81

[6] “Digital storage projections for 2019,
[Online]. Available:

part 1,”

Forbes,

Apr. 2019.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomcoughlin/2018/12/21/

digital-storage-projections-for-2019-part-1/#2c615a534428
[7] “Encrypting stored email with postfix : Kacang bawang,” Apr. 2019. [Online].
Available: http://kacangbawang.com/encrypting-stored-email-with-postfix/
[8] “Expense management, travel, invoice software, travel expense reporting - sap
concur,” Apr. 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.concur.com/
[9] “Forget
ally
able:

about

hands

to

backdoors,

this

cops,”

Forbes,

is

the
Apr.

data

whatsapp

actu-

2019.

[Online].

Avail-

https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/01/22/whatsapp-

facebook-backdoor-government-data-request/
[10] “getrandom(2) - linux manual page,”

Apr. 2019. [Online]. Available:

http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/getrandom.2.html
[11] “Github - dsprenkels/sss: Library for the shamir secret sharing scheme,” Apr.
2019. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/dsprenkels/sss
[12] “Github - jcushman/libgfshare,” Apr. 2019. [Online]. Available:

https:

//github.com/jcushman/libgfshare
[13] “Github - openssl/openssl: Tls/ssl and crypto library,” Apr. 2019. [Online].
Available: https://github.com/openssl/openssl
[14] “How the assistance and access bill is going to hurt every australian.”
Hackernoon, Apr. 2019. [Online]. Available: https://hackernoon.com/how-theassistance-and-access-bill-is-going-to-hurt-every-australian-7a5c935c797f

82

[15] “Hundreds of millions of facebook user records were exposed on amazon cloud
server,” CBS, Apr. 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
millions-facebook-user-records-exposed-amazon-cloud-server/
[16] “Mail (mx) server survey,”

Apr. 2019. [Online]. Available:

http://

www.securityspace.com/s survey/data/man.201809/mxsurvey.html
[17] “Mining hardware comparison.” Mar. 2019. [Online]. Available:

https:

//en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Mining hardware comparison
[18] “The

postfix

home

page,”

Apr.

2019.

[Online].

Available:

http:

Introduction,”

Apr.

2019.

[Online].

Available:

http:

//www.postfix.org/
[19] “Safecurves:

//safecurves.cr.yp.to/
[20] “scipy.integrate.quad
[Online].

Available:

-

scipy

v1.2.1

reference

guide,”

Apr.

2019.

https://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy/reference/generated/

scipy.integrate.quad.html
[21] A. Abdallah and M. Salleh, “Secret sharing scheme security and performance
analysis,” in 2015 International Conference on Computing, Control, Networking,
Electronics and Embedded Systems Engineering (ICCNEEE), Sep. 2015, pp.
173–180.
[22] H. Abelson, R. Anderson, S. M. Bellovin, J. Benalob, M. Blaze, W. Diffie,
J. Gilmore, P. G. Neumann, R. L. Rivest, J. I. Schiller, and B. Schneier,
“The risks of key recovery, key escrow, and trusted third-party encryption,”
World Wide Web J., vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 241–257, Jun. 1997. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=275079.275104
83

[23] D. Adrian, K. Bhargavan, Z. Durumeric, P. Gaudry, M. Green, J. A. Halderman,
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Appendix A
Hellman table success derivation

The success chance of a TMTO is the chance that any given output of the hash
function is reversible by the tables. These tables are computed based on certain
parameters, which affect the success chance. We review TMTOs and these parameters
in Section 3.1.
In the original TMTO paper in 1980, Hellman finds a lower bound for the success
chance of one of his TMTO tables through some simple reasoning and algebra [40]. We
review Hellman’s derivation here and extend it to find Equation A.2. This extension is
not overly complex and has been used by many TMTO authors [42]. In our research,
we did not find a long form derivation of this equation. This appendix provides that
missing long form derivation. Kusuda et al. found through experimentation that this
equation produces a lower bound on the success chance of TMTOs [44].
We can think of the success chance of a TMTO table as a function of the number
of preimages that are “covered” by the table. If the preimage for a given hash value
was never computed by the table creator during precomputation, there’s no way to
use the table to reverse that hash value.
Let’s label this number of preimages covered by a table as the set Ai,j where i is
the index of the row and j is the index in the chain of that row. This is the set of every
distinct preimage that has been computed, resulting in a corresponding hash. The
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i and j parameters determine the row and index in the chain that the table creator
has reached. After precomputation of a table is complete, their covered preimages
will be Am,t .
Our probability of success for our table Pr[Stable ] is the probability that any given
hash is in the table and can be shown as:

Pr[Stable ] =

1
∗ E[|Am,t |]
N

Where |Ai,j | is the number of elements in Ai,j and N is the input space of the
cryptographic function.
Our preimages are generated in a number of rows spanning a number of columns.
This can be modeled mathematically like so:
" m t−1
#
X X Pr[Xi,j is new]
1
Pr[Stable ] =
∗E
N
N
i=1 j=0
By being “new” we mean the preimage in row i, column j (Xi,j ) has not appeared
in the table previously and thus increases the size of Ai,j .
We know that the probability Pr[Xi,j is new] is at least equal to or higher than
the probability that Xi,j is new and every Xi,k where k < j is new.

Pr[Xi,j is new] ≥ Pr[Xi,0 is new]
∗ Pr[Xi,1 is new|Xi,0 is new]
∗...
∗ Pr[Xi,j is new|Xi,0 is new, Xi,1 is new, ..., Xi,j−1 is new]
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This takes the chance of chain merges into account. We describe chain merges in
Section 3.1. Xi,j would be a duplicate if any Xi,k , k < j were a duplicate. Multiplying
our probability by the chance that each previous index in the chain was new represents
this chance [44].
Substituting Ai,j recursively, we can see that this equation is equivalent to following equation because Ai,0 is the number of new preimages at the start of row
i.
N − |Ai,0 |
N
N − |Ai,0 | − 1
∗
N

Pr[Xi,j is new] ≥

∗...
∗

N − |Ai,0 | − j
N

If we assume that every single preimage was new, we can substitute in i ∗ t for
each of the |Ai,0 | − k, k ≥ 0, k ≤ j, leaving us with:

Pr[Xi,j is new] ≥

N −i∗t
N

j+1

This allowed Hellman to derive the final equation.
j
m
t 
1 XX N − i ∗ t
Pr[Stable ] ≥
N i=1 j=1
N

(A.1)

Note here that this lower bound in Equation A.1 could’ve been tighter if (i−1)∗t−k
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were substituted in for each |Ai,0 | − k, k ≥ 0, k ≤ j instead of simply i ∗ t for each.
j
m
t
1 X X Y N − (i − 1) ∗ t − k
Pr[Stable ] ≥
N i=1 j=1 k=0
N

Using Equation A.1 allows us to make some approximations that might not have
been possible with a closer bound.
When using l tables, our hash chance of success for reversing the hash Pr[Shash ]
becomes:
Pr[Shash ] ≥ 1 − (1 − Pr[Stable ])l
We don’t have to worry about merging chains across tables because they use
different reduction functions. Each table’s chance of success is independent if different
starting points are used for each table. We will not run out of distinct starting points
as long as m ∗ l ≤ N .
When m and t are large, this equation becomes very difficult to compute. Even
using heavy parallelization on available GPUs, this equation would take months to
compute for N = 280 .
We approximate this chance of success using integrals, which uses far less CPU
time.
In this approximation, a linear approximation to ex is used.

e−x ≈ 1 − x

This approximation allows us to estimate the lower bound as:
m
t
1 X X −ijt
e N
Pr[Stable ] ≈
N i=1 j=1
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We can estimate a sum with an integral from 0 to t:
m Z
X

1
Pr[Stable ] ≈
N

Pr[Stable ] ≈
The

m
N2

t

e

j=0

i=1

m Z
X

1
N

−ijt
N



1
di −
N
!

t

e

−ijt
N

−

di

j=0

i=0

!

m
N2

term is very close to 0 when m  N :
m Z
1 X t −ijt
e N di
Pr[Stable ] ≈
N i=1 j=0

1
Pr[Stable ] ≈
N
Pr[Stable ] ≈

!
 
m 
X
−it2
N
N
− ∗e N
− − ∗ e0
it
it
i=1
1
t

−it
i=m
X
1−e N

2

∗

it
N

i=0

t
N

!
−

1−1
N

Here we use another integral approximation of the sum:
1
Pr[Stable ] ≈
t

i=m

Z

it2
N

with u (u =

it2
, du
N

=

1
Pr[Stable ] ≈
t

Z

−it2
N

it
N

i=0

1
Pr[Stable ] ≈
t
Replacing

1−e

i=m

i=0

1−e
i

∗

−it2
N

t
di
N

di

t2
di):
N

Z

1
Pr[Stable ] ≈
t

u= mt
N

2

u=0

Z

u= mt
N

u=0
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1 − e−u N
du
u∗N
t2
t2

2

1 − e−u
du
u

If we use the e−x ≈ 1 − x approximation here, we can create an equation for when
multiple Hellman tables are used:

Pr[STMTO ] ≈ 1 − (1 − Pr[Stable ])l

Pr[STMTO ] ≈ 1 − exp

l
t

Z

u= mt
N

u=0

2

1 − e−u
du
u

!
(A.2)

In this thesis, we calculate this integral with the scipy function integrate.quad
[20].
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